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ABSTRACT

The Politics of Disaster Relief Policy (1947-2005)
Viviane E. Foyou
Like other studies of agenda setting, this research builds on the work of Baumgartner and
Jones (1993), King (1997), Worsham (1997) and Tzoumis (2001), and most recently,
Wilkerson, Feeley, Schiereck, and Sue (1999). Specifically, the focus of this study is on
disaster relief policy. Two basic objectives guide the study. The first is to examine the
origins and evolution of disaster relief policy in order to understand its shifting image.
The second is to understand how Congress governs the agenda of disaster relief policy in
the post-war period.
The analysis in this dissertation is derived from data collected on disaster relief-related
bills and hearings in Congress from 1947-2005. Through the utilization of both bill
introductions and congressional hearings, general patterns of issue composition,
committee competition and policy monopoly are examined.
This study demonstrates that although congressional committees often serve as the
institutional anchor for subsystem arrangement and a policy monopoly, punctuating
events can alter the policy equilibrium maintained by such an arrangement.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost I want to thank my Lord and Savior Jesus Christ for getting me
through this very challenging and rewarding process. Without his grace and mercy none
of this would have been possible. I would like to thank my family, my siblings and
especially my mother who did not finish her doctoral degree in physiology so she can
raise her children. Her patience, understanding, guidance and assistance were important
in completing this research. Equally important, I want to acknowledge my committee
chair and advisor, Professor Jeff Worsham. His interest, guidance, and critical review
proved consequential in completing this research. I also want to thank the rest of my
committee, Professors Kilwein, Berch, Crichlow, and Gerber for being so supportive
throughout the process. I want to extend a special thanks to Jennifer McCintosh who
provided financial support as well as her maternal love and compassion during this
process. Finally, I want to thank my friends, and colleagues for their support and
encouragement. To everyone I mentioned and those I may have missed, I want to say
thank you from the bottom of my heart.
This dissertation is dedicated to the Kouamo Family especially my grandparents
Kouamo Justin and Kouamen Jacqueline as wells as my father Emmanuel Foyou who
never had the opportunity to witness this accomplishment.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................ iii
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... iv
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... vi
List of Figures ................................................................................................................... vii
Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................................................1
Chapter 2: Agenda Setting and Issue Definition..................................................................4
The Systemic Agenda ..............................................................................................5
The Institutional Agenda........................................................................................13
Conclusion .............................................................................................................19
Chapter 3: The Historical Development of Disaster Relief- FEMA..................................21
Gaining Agenda Access: Reinterpreting “Acts of God”........................................22
Civil Defense versus Natural Disasters..................................................................27
The Internal Restructuring of FEMA .....................................................................34
Conclusion .............................................................................................................49
Chapter 4: Tracking Agenda Status ...................................................................................50
Mapping the Agenda of Civil Defense ..................................................................51
Mapping the Agenda of Natural Disaster ..............................................................60
Comparison of the Two Dominant Images of Disaster Relief...............................68
Conclusion .............................................................................................................72
Chapter 5: Dissecting Disaster Relief Agenda Setting and Efforts of Issue .....................73
Data Collection ......................................................................................................74
Mapping Hearing Activity .....................................................................................75
Policy Jurisdiction and Committee Competition ...................................................78
Topics of Discussion ..............................................................................................82
Conclusion .............................................................................................................84
Chapter 6: Concluding Comments .....................................................................................86
References ..........................................................................................................................89
Appendix: ...........................................................................................................................94

iv

LIST OF TABLES
Table 4.1

Civil Defense Bill Introductions by Session

Table 4.2

Disaster Relief Bill Introductions by Session

v

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 4.1

Civil Defense Bill Introductions (House and Senate)

Figure 4.2

House Civil Defense Bill Contents

Figure 4.3

Senate Civil Defense Bill Contents

Figure 4.4

House Civil Defense Bill Referrals

Figure 4.5

Senate Civil Defense Bill Referrals

Figure 4.6

House Herfindahl Index

Figure 4.7

Senate Herfindahl Index

Figure 4.8

Natural Disaster Bill Introductions (House and Senate)

Figure 4.9

House Natural Disaster Bill Content

Figure 4.10

Senate Natural Disaster Bill Content

Figure 4.11

House Natural Disaster Bill Referrals

Figure 4.12

Senate Natural Disaster Bill Referrals

Figure 4.13

House Herfindahl Index

Figure 4.14

Senate Herfindahl Index

Figure 4.15

House Natural Disaster and Civil Defense Bill Introductions

Figure 4.16

Senate Natural Disaster and Civil Defense Bill Introductions

Figure 4.17

Bill Introductions and Presidential State of the Union: Natural
Disaster

Figure 4.18

Bill Introductions and Presidential State of the Union: Civil
Defense

Figure 5.1

House Disaster Relief Policy Hearings

Figure 5.2

Senate Disaster Relief Policy Hearings

Figure 5.3

Civil Defense Hearings

Figure 5.4

Natural Disaster Hearings

Figure 5.5

House Natural Disaster Committee Competition

Figure 5.6

Senate Natural Disaster Committee Competition

Figure 5.7

House Civil Defense Hearings

Figure 5.8

Senate Civil Defense Hearings

Figure 5.9

House Natural Disasters by Topic

Figure 5.10

Senate Natural Disasters by Topic
vi

Chapter One
Introduction
Natural disasters as focusing events are unpredictable and sudden and their
occurrences are known simultaneously by the mass public and policy elites (Birkland,
1998). Given their abrupt occurrence, natural disasters have an immense potential to
reshape, change or influence the policy process. From 1947 to 2005, numerous disasters
have shaped U.S. disaster relief policy as illustrated through the creation of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). Following the events of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, one
can say that disasters affect people and society in numerous ways. Whether man-made or
natural, disasters challenge the operation, resilience, competence and responsiveness of
the government (Sylves, 2008). In an effort to understand how disaster relief is linked to
the actions of government, it is important to examine the agenda in which policies are
initiated and created.
This research examines how the emphasis of disaster relief policy shifts between
two dominant images-natural disaster and civil defense. A central concern is to explore
how Congress has governed the agenda of disaster relief policy since the post-war era.
The intent of this question is to analyze institutional factors that influenced the agenda of
disaster relief policy. In addition, posing this question is important because it forces one
to explore the linkage between civil defense and natural disaster as it relates to aspects of
agenda setting. The implementation or effectiveness of disaster relief policy aimed at
assessing emergency management is not reviewed, but I will explore congressional
agenda setting of disaster relief by measuring bill introductions and assessing
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congressional hearing activities. To meet the above objective, the research is structured
according to five areas of discussion and analysis. In chapter two, I describe the two
types of agenda setting. This discussion serves as a conduit to developing the research
theory; which is explicitly presented in the later portion of the chapter. Chapter three
presents the historical development of disaster relief policy and FEMA. The discussion
highlights when and how disaster relief emerges on the agenda as well as the interaction
between the President and Congress. This chapter is significant because it seeks to
accentuate the research question and its overall contribution. Chapters four and five
illustrate how agenda dynamics in disaster relief are influenced by the institutional
actions of congressional committees/subsystems as well as endogenous and exogenous
punctuating events.
Particularly, chapter four tracks the agenda status of civil defense and natural
disaster by focusing on legislative bill introductions. Serving as a transition into chapter
five, this discussion examines and compares the level of attention that both the House and
Senate give to civil defense and natural disaster issues. In addition, this chapter tracks the
referral of disaster relief bill introduction. The purpose of this analysis is to explore
policy jurisdiction. Chapter five expands on the importance of committee turf by
exploring and assessing the agenda of disaster relief policy through the examination of
legislative hearings. A committee may serve as the institutional anchor for subsystem
arrangement and policy monopoly, but punctuating events may alter the equilibrium
established by such arrangement. Moreover, not only can the equilibrium be disrupted,
but such events can alter policy outputs as well. Finally, chapter six highlights how my
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research contributes to the understanding of agenda setting as it relates to disaster relief
policy and the steps that can be taken for future research.
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Chapter 2
Agenda Setting and Issue Definition
Introduction
The 20th century saw an increase in the occurrence of natural disasters. Local,
state, and federal government mobilized in response to disasters such as the flood of
1927, the Long Beach Earthquake of 1933, Hurricane Hazel of 1954, Hurricane Camille
in 1965, the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake, Hurricane Hugo in 1989, the 1993
Midwestern flood, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, among others. At the same time, the
20th century saw increased attention to civil defense matters associated with two world
wars, the Red Scare, the Cold War, and terrorism. These events put the discussion of
disaster prevention and response on the congressional agenda, resulting in the amending
of old policy as well as the creation of new policy. Disasters, as punctuating events,
reshape how stakeholders such as politicians, policymakers and agencies, think about and
respond to public policy.

This study employs agenda setting theory to determine how and which
institutional actors shape disaster relief policy. Agenda-setting may be defined as the
process by which new issues get the attention of policy-makers and also refers to the
manner in which those issues are defined and the effect of the definition on subsequent
policy adoption (Garcia 2007, 1). Agenda-setting is not limited to new issues, but
encompasses the movement of existing issues up and down the institutional agenda
(Garcia 2007, 1). The agenda, as it applies to public policy, is defined as “the list of
subjects or problems to which government officials, and people outside the government
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closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given
point in time” (Kingdon, 1995, 3-4). Cobb and Elder (1972) distinguish two types of
agendas: the systemic agenda and the institutional agenda The systemic agenda
incorporates, “all issues that are commonly perceived by members of the political
community as meriting public attention and as involving matters within the legitimate
jurisdiction of existing governmental authority” (Cobb and Elder, 1972, 85). In turn, the
institutional agenda is composed of “that set of items explicitly up for the active and
serious consideration of authoritative decision makers” (Cobb and Elder, 1972, 85).
Given that claims of policy failure are often made by pro-change groups with the
intention of expanding an issue, their efforts to move ideas from the systemic to the
institutional agenda is the key to understanding the changing course of disaster relief
policy.

The Systemic Agenda
The systemic agenda according to Cobb and Elder (1972, 85) involves, “all issues
that are commonly perceived by members of a political community as meriting public
attention and as involving matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of existing
governmental authority.” Within the systemic agenda, the general public has the
opportunity to discuss policy issues such as health care, drug abuse, environmental
protection, and disasters, among others. Most of the items that appear on the systemic
agenda are often general with no specific defined solution.
Baumgartner and Jones build on Schattschneider’s work by describing how the
strategic manipulation of a policy image by policy entrepreneurs often leads to conflict
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expansion, the mobilization of new advocates, and the undoing of long-standing
institutional structures (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 37). The manipulation of a policy
image is exemplified in their study of agricultural policy, where the pesticides subsystem
lost control of the agenda, as the issue was redefined to include not only economics but
also health and environmental damage stemming from the application of pesticides.
Overall, policy images play a critical role in the expansion of issues to the previously
apathetic (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 25).
Downs (1972) argues that public attention to political issues typically follow a
cyclical pattern. Using environmental policy as a case study, Downs traced public interest
in environmental policy through a life cycle of sorts. He opens with a pre-problem stage,
where there are low levels of public attention, followed by a “state of alarmed discovery
and euphoria generate much attention,” and end with a “realization of the costs of solving
the problem and a gradual decline in public interest” (Downs, 1972, 10). For Downs,
agenda setting was an exercise in futility; if the goal was lasting, public inspired policy
change. Baumgartner and Jones employ Downs’ theory as support for their analysis of
the role of the institutional venue in agenda formation. They refer to the Downsian cycle
of interest attention as the “mobilization of enthusiasm” where those concerned with an
issue demand governmental action, usually through the allocation of resources
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 890). According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 88), a
Downsian mobilization may create new policy monopolies or at least set the stage for
new institutional arrangement and programs.
Although both Schattschneider and Downs talk about issue expansion, the
former’s “mobilization of criticism” breaks down rather than builds lasting institutional
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arrangements. According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 101), both Downs’ (1972) and
Schattschneider’s (1975) varieties of mobilization may occur relative to the same issue
over a period of time (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 101). More importantly, these
mobilizations may have important policy consequences, even though they may be
opposite in terms of substance (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 84).
Like Downs (1972) and Schattschneider (1975), Cobb and Elder (1972, 12) stress
the power of the “pre-political” phase, stating that “pre-decisional processes often play
the most critical role in determining what issues and alternatives are to be considered by
the polity and the probable choices that will be made[…] the critical question becomes,
how does an issue or demand become or fail to become the focus of concern and interest
within a polity?” According to Cobb and Elder (1972), the answer is that a problem often
gains standing on the systemic agenda only after its proponents engage additional
advocates by redefining the issue; usually by substituting one policy image for another
(Cobb and Elder, 1983, 47). The process of issue redefinition enables policy
entrepreneurs to attract the attention of new groups by expanding the conflict associated
with a particular policy issue or question. They suggest that issues on the systemic
agenda are specific, relatively simple to understand or execute, have a large potential
impact or long-term consequences, and involve a principle or precedent already set (Cobb
and Elder 1972, 96-102).
For Cobb and Ross (1997), not all issues make the agenda, because some
individuals and groups work to keep topics from being addressed through the policy
process. The authors focused on agenda denial, “the political process by which issues that
one would expect to get meaningful consideration from the political institution in a
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society fail to get taken seriously” (Cobb and Elder, 1997, xi). Agenda denial concerns
tactics used by issue opponents to keep issue initiators from attaining success at any stage
of the policy development.
Cobb and Ross (1997) identified four levels of strategic choice of agenda denial
along a cost analysis from low to high cost strategies. The first level, the low cost strategy
emphasizes the non-recognition of the initiator position. The key element of this strategy
is non-confrontation consisting of varying forms of denial. This strategy is characterized
by the refusal to recognize that a problem exists, defining the problem as an isolated
incident, and then refusing to recognize the existence of groups advocating the issue
(Cobb and Ross, 1997, 10). The second strategy is the medium cost strategy where the
goal is to attack either the issue or the initiating group. Here the strategy is allocation of
blame. This strategy is characterized by the use of deception (lying, spreading false
rumors, planting false stories, etc.) or distorting one’s position with a scientific façade
(Cobb and Ross, 1997, 12). The third strategy is the medium cost strategy that consists of
symbolic placation and is mostly used by public officials. It is characterized by the
creation of a committee or commission to study the problem, postponement, and
superficial actions that make no difference (Cobb and Ross, 1997, 12). The final strategy
is the high cost strategy that consists of threats or violence. It includes electoral threats or
the withholding of support, economic threats, legal actions, and physical threats (Cobb
and Ross, 1997, 13). Cobb and Ross (1997) argue that an opponent seeks the desired
result at the lowest cost possible but will gradually turn to higher cost strategies with the
lack of success.
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Nelson (1984), utilizing the issue of child abuse as a case study, examined, “how
public officials learn about new problems, decide to give them their personal attention,
and mobilize their organizations to respond to them” (Nelson, 1984, 20). Nelson cites
five common catalysts for agenda setting: catastrophes, technological and demographic
change, inequitable distribution of resources, organizational growth, and structural
readiness for change (Nelson, 1984, 24). She focuses on an organizational approach to
agenda setting and affirms “the process of agenda setting can be conceptualized as having
four stages: issue recognition, issue adoption, setting priorities among issues, and issue
maintenance” (Nelson, 1984, 22-23). In addition, she notes that the agenda setting stages
will vary according to the type of issue, as well as what types of people and groups are
participating in the process (Nelson, 1984, 25).
Stone (1997), in her study of the political nature of public policy choices, noted
that, “problem definition is a matter of representation because the description of a
situation is a portrayal from only one many points” (Stone, 1997, 133). Individuals,
interest groups, and government agencies choose to portray an issue strategically, from
different perspectives, in order to promote the course of action they perceive to be most
to their advantage. For Stone (1997) the essence of policy making is “the struggle over
ideas, a constant struggle over the criteria for classification, the boundaries of categories,
and the definition of ideas that guide the way people behave” (Stone, 1997, 11).
Like Stone (1997), Baumgartner and Jones (1993) place an emphasis on the
centrality and effects of issue definition. Issue definition is basic to their analysis of
agenda access because it is able to provoke the punctuated equilibrium cycle in politics.
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) argue that issue definition can attract interests that were
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previously uninvolved with the issue, thereby resulting in a venue shift (Baumgartner and
Jones, 1993, 25). There is a general agreement among scholars of public policy
(Schattschneider, 1975; Cobb and Elder, 1983; Nelson, 1984; Carmines and Stimson,
1989; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1995; Stone, 1997; Cobb and Ross, 1997)
that problem definition and the mobilization of previously uninterested groups are
important factors in determining whether or not an issue reaches the systemic agenda.
An important means of securing a place on the systemic agenda involves use of
the media. The agenda setting capacity of the news media has been the object of a large
amount of research in recent years. Stein (2001) posits that the more controversial the
issue, the greater the need to inform the public and to gauge the public reaction to the
proposed change. Information disseminated by the media tells us what and how to think
about issues; thus setting the terms of any debate over controversial matters. Studies have
shown that the media plays a role in shaping public opinion. Cook (1998) develops a
model of the media as an influential force in the agenda setting and public policy process.
He writes “ the American news media can and do directly influence perceptions of public
moods, and in other ways shape the context of one legislator asking another for support,
whether or not the public was involved, has chosen sides or was even aware of the
issues” (Cook, 1998,11).
Cook (1998) views the media as a filter that functions as a conveyer of
information to political actors. He also notes that political theorists such as Scattschneider
who were working in the 1950s and 1960s witnessed a different political system than that
of the mid-1990s. As a result, one no longer finds a stable situation, with a durable group
of players negotiating according to agreed-upon rules. The current situation is fluid and
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unstable, with political entrepreneurs and interest groups aggressively promoting not only
policy issues but also their preferred solutions (Cook, 1998, 121). In Cook’s view, there
is an ongoing, interactive process between public officials and journalists that has an
influence on agenda setting: “Politicians dictate conditions and rules of access and
designate certain events and issues as important by providing an arena for them.
Journalists, in turn, decide whether something is interesting enough to cover, the context
in which to place it, and the prominence the story receives”
(Cook, 1998, 12). He uses the term “negotiation of newsworthiness” to describe the
relationship between the media and political processes. Cook (1998) also argues that as a
result of the lack of strong, pervasive institutions such as political parties, the news media
has taken command of political communication (Cook, 1998, 83).
A variety of studies suggest that the media is the primary source of information on
national political matters including defense preparedness, foreign policy, youth crime,
health care, and environmental issues (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Iyengar et al,1982;
Nelson 1984; Linsky 1986; Page and Shapiro 1992; Trumbo 1995; Bartels 1996; Hacker
1998; Baumgartner, et al 1997; Shepard 1998; Soroka 2002). Baumgartner and Jones, in
summing up this literature, as well as their own work, argue that “the media help create
situations that make increased government attention almost unavoidable” (Baumgartner
et al., 1997, 23). They argue that an issue’s policy image is determined largely by the
“tone” of the media coverage. When rapid change in media coverage occurs, changes in
the patterns of mobilization in the policy area are likely to follow.
If the media is a vehicle for gaining entrance into the public agenda, others have
argued that punctuating events work to advance issues on the agenda as well as to trigger
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policy change (Cobb and Elder, 1983; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Kingdon 1995).
Punctuating events may serve as a “window of opportunity” for politically disadvantaged
groups, enabling them to forward an item that previously had been ignored by dominant
groups and advocacy coalitions.
Punctuating events allow interest groups, government leaders, policy
entrepreneurs, the media and the citizenry to identify with a new problem or pay greater
attention to existing but dormant problems. This increased awareness can help identify
solutions in the wake of apparent policy failure. Even though groups attempt to refocus
the public agenda via media attention, major punctuating events may reach the agenda
with little if any promotion, when images and symbols of suffering are clearly visible.
Media coverage of suffering as caused by natural and other non-natural disasters is not
easily overlooked by an attentive public, nor easily constrained by the dominant policy
monopolies. Outrage over policy failure, epitomized by media-generated images of
devastation, is utilized by pro-change groups as a recruiting tool –thereby expanding the
issue and transforming the issues into tangible evidence of the need for policy change
(Birkland, 1998).
According to Schattschneider (1975), issue expansion is important because it
increases the likelihood that more influential and powerful actors will enter the conflict
on the side of policy change. He suggests that an increase in attention can further tilt the
balance of debate in favor of pro-change groups. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) echo
Schattschneider’s argument, finding that policy under constant scrutiny is likely to be
assessed negatively, compelling monopoly holders to accommodate dissenting views.
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This tenure in the limelight is more likely to result in policy change as dissenters expect
that their proposed solutions be implemented to salvage the failed policy.

The Institutional Agenda
The institutional agenda consists of a “set of items explicitly up for the active and
serious consideration of authoritative decision makers” (Cobb and Elder, 1972, 85). The
institutional or governmental agenda, often described as the action agenda, tends to be
more specific and concrete in content than the systemic agenda. The institutional agenda,
which refers to action by government to deal with an identified problem, is characterized
by conflict and tension. The federal nature of the American government with its checks
and balances sets the agenda up for intergovernmental conflicts in the policy process.
Similarly, the separation of powers provides a variety of institutional venues at the
national level to be targeted by those interested in moving an issue from the systemic to
the government agenda. As Tzoumis (2001, 5) argues, a policy often reaches
congressional attention because it has been framed or defined in a fashion that warrants
governmental action.
Like Tzoumis (2001), Baumgartner and Jones (1993) assert that the way in which
a policy is framed is important because it determines the players and interests that will be
involved in the issue. Schattschneider (1960) argues that policy losers strive to broaden
the scope of the conflict in hopes of persuading nonparticipants into understanding the
issue from their perspective. Thus, expanding the scope is significant because it is
instrumental in determining how the issue is defined, and consequently which policy is
implemented. Tzoumis (2001, 5) asserts that if an issue is defined in a manner in which
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the government is willing to address, then it will have a greater propensity of capturing
congressional attention. According to Eyestone (1978, 175), agenda status is primarily
achieved only with regard to endemic issues-“public problems that extend over a period
of years and generate incremental solutions.” He also suggests that Congress is
consequential to the status of an issue because it is this institution that groups seek to
access in order to have their problem addressed by policymakers. Kingdon (1995, 199)
indicates groups who are able to gain access are far more likely to bolster their issues on
the agenda and block consideration of proposal they do not prefer. Moreover, such
groups are more likely to define the image of the issue according to their interests
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).
A change in policy venue can result in broadening the scope of the debate and
often precedes the enactment of new policy (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993. 31). In many
instances when the venue of a policy changes, those participants who previously had
minimal influence may find themselves with greater power. Oftentimes, participants who
form a subsystem can mold or define an issue in a manner consistent with their interests.
A subsystem is defined as “a political alliance uniting members of an administrative
agency, a congressional committee or subcommittee, and an interest group with shared
values and preferences in the same substantive area of policy making” (Milakovick and
Gordon, 2001, 89). Such an institutional arrangement can prohibit an array of interests
from becoming involved in the policy making process, thus allowing the subsystem to
define the issue accordingly, an in most cases at the expense of those formerly excluded.
“ Subsystems then are a means of getting around the seeming inability of groups to effect
closure on decisions that affect large number of interests” (Worsham, 2004, 4). Worsham
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(1998, 486) argues that a “subsystem’s ability to maintain policy making autonomy is not
absolute; but rather it varies across time and policy area.”
Worsham (1998) illustrates that subsystem politics may assume any of three
forms---dominant, transitory, or competitive coalitions. Dominant coalitions benefit
select interests as opposed to the public interest. Under such an arrangement, a particular
committee or subcommittee is able to establish and control a formidable jurisdiction in a
particular policy area. Transitory coalitions emerge when “latent interests of some
members of a dominant coalition supersede the interests they share in common with other
members of the dominant coalition” (Worsham, 1998, 488). Competitive coalitions
surface when a dominant coalition is openly challenged by a new coalition. In some
cases, this may occur when transitory coalitions engage in prolonged conflict, in which
formerly excluded minority interests are able to effectively compete over the benefits of a
particular policy. Competition may also be the result of challenges by members of
another committee (and subsystem), who, in response to perceived threats to their
autonomy engage in turf wars (Ripley and Franklin 1986; King 1997). Challengers may
simply be new arrivals in the policy domain who are in search of a subsystem
(committee) niche of their own (Browne 1988).
Other means of altering policy equilibrium involve the concerted efforts of policy
entrepreneurs. Policy entrepreneurs are able to reframe issues so that favored solutions
are given to problems. Sheingate (2006, 18) defines policy entrepreneurs as individuals
whose creative acts have effects on politics, policies, and institutions and are a significant
force in explaining subsystem variations. To him, entrepreneurs shape the terms of
political debate, frame issues, affect politics, define problems, and influence agenda.
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Entrepreneurs are also considered as source of innovations in terms of investing resources
in the creation of new policies, agencies or the formation of new collective actions.
According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993), issue definition and institutional
change can allow seemingly secure policies to experience unexpected shifts that alter the
approach of the government to a topic. Institutional change often means
committees/agencies in government responsible for a policy are expanded, or
responsibility is shifted to other officials. Since government actors and structure generate
or influence items on the institutional agenda, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) argue that
understanding the dynamic of policy monopolies is essential.
Baumgartner and Jones (2002,19) assert that positive feedback forces decision
makers to shift their attention to previously excluded dimension of a problem, which in
turn may alter subsystem arrangements. Positive feedback models are those in which
“ideas of momentum, bandwagon effects, thresholds and cascades play critical roles” in
the policy process (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002, 7). In short, positive feedback is often
associated with punctuating moments that threaten existing subsystem arrangements.
Positive feedback is also produced by the actions of policy entrepreneurs. Regardless of
their institutional origin, entrepreneurs bring new ideas and new policy proposals that
threaten to upset existing policy equilibrium. Positive feedback may also create new
institutional arrangements, and thus create a new equilibrium that in turn reinforces new
negative feedback processes.
Negative feedback models posit that “ shocks to the system are
dampened….pressures from one side lead to counterpressures from another side, and in
general …self corrective mechanisms keep the system on an even keel” (Baumgartner
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and Jones, 2002, 6). In a negative feedback process “the system reacts to counterbalance,
rather than reinforce, any changes coming from the environment” thus changes are likely
to be incremental (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002, 9). In this process, equilibrium is
produced by institutional arrangements that allow groups to achieve their particular
interests. Such arrangements favor the status quo. Although Baumgartner and Jones
(1993) view positive and negative feedback as representing “patterns of punctuated
change,” they suggest that positive feedback ought not to count as the only instance of
“punctuated equilibrium”(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 244).
For Baumgartner and Jones, issues that reach the agenda through a wave of
popular enthusiasm or “Downsian mobilization,” propel political leaders to delegate
power to experts who were able to convince them that they can solve the problem. In the
instances that issues reach the agenda through criticism or “Schattschneider
mobilization,” political leaders pay attention to the details of the policymaking process
within a specialized policy community (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 84). According to
them, these two types of mobilization can lead to opposite institutional responses: the
waves of enthusiasm lead to the creation of governmental institutions and subsystems,
while the waves of criticism lead to their breakup.
In keeping with Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) approach of punctuated
equilibrium and the important role of positive and negative feedback in politics, this
study uses bill introductions and congressional hearings to trace attention over time of
disaster relief policy in the United Sates. To illustrate how the aforementioned
perspectives and insights to agenda setting are conceptualized throughout the remainder
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of this research the following section highlights the theoretical framework underlying the
analysis.

Design and methods
Like others who have made an effort to track agenda entrance by focusing on
congressional activity, in this study I focus on bill introductions and hearings. Like
Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 2002), I review Congressional hearing activities and bill
introductions, to get a feel for the level of competition in the disaster relief policy
domain. Following their lead (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 2002) and employing data
assembled in the Policy Agendas Project, I employ the annual number of congressional
hearings convened on disaster relief issues as an indicator of congressional attention and
priority regarding this policy arena. The coverage of congressional hearings on an issue
signals the importance of that issue to Congress. It is worth noting that committee
hearings are consequential beyond the limited confines of the particular committee in
which they are held. These hearings provide information to the entire Congress, both
through the intrinsic generation of information and, notably from the very decision to
hold a hearing on a particular topic (Diermeier and Feedersen, 2000, 10). Furthermore,
hearings provide outlets for interest groups to express policy preferences and allow
members of Congress to develop policy proposals. These proposals are then available in
the event that conditions become conducive for major policy change.
Dearing and Rogers, (1996, 1) posit that agenda setting is “an ongoing
competition among issue proponents to gain the attention of policy elites.” Bill
introductions are therefore useful in understanding this process because they serve as an
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important indicator of the chamber’s interest in a particular policy area (Worsham, 2004;
Wilkerson et al., 1999). Employing data assembled by the Congressional Bills Project
and THOMAS, I employ the annual number of bill introductions in both chambers as an
indicator of congressional attention regarding this policy arena. Besides indicating that an
issue has made it on the agenda, bill introduction illustrates committee jurisdiction.

Conclusion
Scholars have argued that problem definition influences agenda setting as well as
policy adoption (Schattschneider, 1975; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1995).
How problems are defined or framed determines what factual evidence is relevant, which
solutions or alternatives are considered effective and feasible, who participates in the
decision process, and eventually, who wins and loses. It is obvious that problem
definitions draw attention to some conditions in society at the expense of others; locate
the causes of the problems; direct the public and elite interest, and subsequently shape
and mobilize political participation (Haider-Markel et al., 2001). When a new issue
definition emerges on the political agenda it is either propelled by a punctuating event or
may dismantle an existing “policy monopoly” and thereby lead to policy change
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1995; Haider-Markel, 1999).
Setting the agenda involves not only getting issues onto an agenda, but also being
able to determine the way in which those issues are defined (Beder, 2002, 25). In
essence, agenda setting is an exercise of power and influence. This study assumes that
although congressional disaster relief committees may have direct influence over the
policy, events and inputs from the environment can influence their agenda setting
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pursuits and activity. Consequently, the thrust of punctuating events and the actions of
other institutional actors and or groups can reinforce or counterbalance the political
underpinnings involved in the policy equilibrium. With this in mind, the following
chapters seek to understand the disaster relief agenda over the post-war era.
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Chapter Three
The Historical Development of Disaster Relief Policy
According to the International Federation of the Red Cross, the Red Crescent
Societies (IFRC), the Center for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters, and the Anton
Brein Centre for Public Health and Tropical Medicine, the risk of disasters occurring is
increasing. With almost two billion people adversely affected by disasters in the past ten
years (Campbell, 2005; IFRC, 2001), Leus (2000) argues that “disaster could only
become more frequent as population increases.” Similarly, Kizer (2000) cautions that
because of population growth and urbanization, we should expect an increased mortality
rate from both natural and man made disasters simply because of the greater population
density. Clearly, interest in disasters and disaster relief have increased in the past decade,
making them an object of increasing interest among those concerned with both disaster
relief policy and the policy process in general.
Essentially, the politics of disaster relief matter because they are directly or
indirectly connected to public policy issues. Once disasters strike, they attain immediate
agenda status and provide a window of opportunity for political action. As such,
policymakers have used the situation to show their concern for citizens’ needs and
demands as well as reinvent institutional structures. Although disasters are unique,
governmental actions encompass all aspect of the agenda setting process in the United
States.
In order to understand the politics of disaster relief, this chapter tracks the
entrance and evolution of natural disaster relief as a topic on the public and government
agendas. The story involves the transformation of responsibility for natural disaster relief
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from a private concern, to a state and local governmental responsibility, and eventually,
one in which the federal government must shoulder the load.
I. Gaining Agenda Access: Reinterpreting “Acts of God”
From its earliest days, disaster relief responsibilities were left to individuals and
charitable organizations, or volunteers at the community level (Birkland, 1997; Sylves,
2008). In essence, there was no expectation that the federal government would become
directly involved in disaster relief. The federal government was asked to step in and help
only when events exceeded the capacity of local and states authorities. Following few
disasters and the awareness of extensive, long-lasting devastation to victims, and
communities, the federal government began to take minimal actions. The first example
of federal emergency assistance involved a congressional act to provide financial
assistance to a New Hampshire town that had been devastated by fire in 1803 (Sylves,
2008).
Despite several catastrophic incidents in the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
including the 1889 flood in Johnstown, Pennsylvania that involved 2,200 fatalities, the
1900 Galveston Hurricane with 12, 000 fatalities and the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake
which incurred 8,000 fatalities, the federal government did not place a significant
emphasis on disaster relief. That being said, the federal government did practice a
variation of preventive policy that centered on the construction of levees by the Army
Corps of Engineers. Still, for the most part, the federal government viewed natural
disasters, such as floods, as “Acts of God” and left the bulk of relief efforts in the hands
of the local community (Platt, 1999, 2).
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If the federal government was reluctant to assume responsibility for the
prevention and relief of natural disasters, it proved more willing to assume a proactive
stance in civil defense, establishing a civilian defense system in 1916 that provided for a
range of actions to protect the general public in the event of an attack. The Council on
National Defense was created to coordinate the “resources and industries for national
defense” and “stimulate civilian morale” under the aegis of the War Department and its
ancillary departments (DHS, 2006, 5). As a presidential advisory board, its works
escalated when the United States entered the war in 1917 and was suspended in 1921
once hostilities ended.
The “Acts of God” policy image changed after the 1927 Great Mississippi Flood,
when business found flooding to be even more important than taxation (Platt, 1999).
Following the flood, various bills were introduced, and the Committee on Flood Control
held hearings. In 1928, Congress passed the Flood Control Act, which marked the first
permanent federal involvement in managing natural disasters. The bill not only
authorized the Army Corps of Engineers to start levee construction along major
waterways, but also allocated funds for rebuilding in the areas devastated by the floods.
Clearly congressional opinion about the focus of responsibility for natural disaster relief
and prevention began to change, culminating in the first ever-permanent fund for flood
control activities (Holahan and Steed, 2008, 10).
Arguably, it was the events associated with an economic disaster, the Great
Depression that provided the window of opportunity for those interested in making
disaster prevention and relief a federal responsibility. The Army Corps of Engineers, the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Bureau of Public Roads, and the Flood Control
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Act of 1934 all came out of that period (Haddow and Bullock, 2006, 3). Reactive in
nature, these governmental actions authorized the financing, construction, and
maintenance of thousands of miles of levees, floods walls, and tunnels throughout the
U.S (Schneider, 1995). It is important to note that no attention was given to nonstructural
programs that could actually encourage citizens and communities to prepare for disasters
before they occurred (Schneider, 1995).
As World War II ignited in Europe, President Roosevelt, in the act of setting an
agenda, reestablished the Council of National Defense in 1940 where states were once
again asked to establish local counterpart councils. Tensions among federal, state and
local governments began to rise about the authority and resources (DHS, 2005, 5). On
one hand, the states claimed that they were not given enough power to manage civil
defense tasks in their own jurisdictions, while the local governments asserted that state
governments did not give urban areas proper consideration and resources. As such, nonattack disaster preparedness remained almost entirely the responsibility of states, while
the federal funding was reserved primarily for attack preparedness. Given the extensive
civilian bombing going on in Europe, concerns about possible attacks against the U.S.
increased. President Roosevelt responded to the increasing concern of the public and
local officials by creating the Office of Civilian Defense in 1941 (DHS, 2005, 5). The
office was delegated to protect civilians which include morale maintenance, promotion of
volunteer involvement, nutrition and physical education. Like the Council of National
Defense, the Office of Civilian Defense created corresponding defense councils at the
local government level. For example, the Office of Civilian Defense began the
development of concrete civil defense plans, which include air raid drills, black outs, and
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sand bag stockpiling (DHS, 2005, 6). With the end of World War II, most U.S. officials
agreed that the risk of an attack on the U.S. was minimal and as a result once in office
President Truman abolished the Office of Civilian Defense.
Even though the war was over, the Soviet Union’s pursuit of a nuclear bomb
threatened the U.S. From this perspective, President Truman reexamined the national
defense structure while Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947. This act
created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as the National Security
Resources Board, which was responsible for mobilizing civilian and military support, and
maintaining adequate reserves and effective resources in the event of war ( DHS, 2005,
7). As U.S. relations with the Soviet Union became increasingly strained, President
Truman began to implement civil defense policy reforms, by establishing the Office of
Civil Defense Planning, the Office of Defense Mobilization in 1950, with the belief that
civil defense responsibilities should fall mostly in the hands of the state and local
governments.
Subsequently, Congress responded by enacting the Federal Civil Defense Act of
1950. This act placed most of the civil defense burden on the states and created the
Federal Civil Defense Administration which was to formulate a national policy to guide
the states’ efforts. The act also allocated significant funding for shelter initiative. As the
Federal Civil Defense Administration led shelter building, coordination between the
federal and states, establishment of attack warning system, stockpiled supplies and
national civic education campaign, Congress became increasingly concern about federal
disaster assistance, especially in the aftermath of major disasters that grabbed the nation’s
attention, for example, the flooding the Midwest ( DHS, 2005, 8).

25

This concern was followed by the passage of the Federal Disaster Relief Act of
1950. The act was designed to lessen the economic impact of disasters on state and local
governments, and was also the first in a series of bills that transitioned the federal
government from its negligible pre-1950 disaster commitment to the current structure
(DHS, 2007, 7). The act authorized funding for the repair of local public facilities upon
presidential approval (Bea, 2005, 80). For the most part, disaster relief policy consisted of
disaster specific legislation enacted in the aftermath of catastrophic disasters like the
1964 Alaska earthquake, the 1964-65 winter floods in the Pacific Northwest, and
Hurricane Betsy in 1965. The rationale for specific legislation after each disaster was that
each presented “an unparalleled disaster [that] requires extraordinary measures” (Bea,
2007, 22).
Despite the magnitude and frequency of disasters, not a single authority had
primary responsibility for disaster relief. Rather, control of disaster relief programs
shifted from the Federal Civil Defense Administration (1943-1958), to the Housing and
Home Finance Agency (1951-52), to the Office of Civil Defense and Mobilization (19581962), to the Office of Emergency Planning (1962-1974) and ultimately to the Federal
Disaster Assistance Administration of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (1974-1979) (Platt 1999,15). The evolution of disaster relief policy during
this time period took the form of two distinct streams of legislation: one that dealt with
general disaster relief provisions and another that dealt with loans for business,
individuals, and farmers (May, 2005, 11).
Following a series of major disasters that rattled the nation--Hurricane Hilda in
New Orleans in 1964, the Alaskan earthquake in 1964, Hurricane Betsy in the southeast
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in 1965, and the violent tornado that swept through Indiana on Palm Sunday in 1965,
Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, acting as an entrepreneur, sponsored a legislation in 1965
that granted emergency federal loans assistance to disaster victims. In 1966, the Disaster
Relief Act was passed to codify existing law and provide relief assistance for higher
education institutions and rural communities. The act formulated a “dual-use approach”
policy as a means to link civil defense warning systems with threats from natural
disasters. The policy instructed the Defense Department to use civil defense activities to
prepare for natural disaster mitigation and preparedness (Sylves, 2008, 50). Once in
office, President Gerald Ford repealed the “dual-use approach” policy, returning civil
defense to its previous function, primarily a nuclear attack preparedness program. He also
eliminated funding for natural disaster mitigation and preparedness (Sylves, 2008, 50).
The congressional response was to amend the Civil Defense Act of 1950 authorizing
funding on a dual-use basis “to prepare for the threat of enemy attack and for natural
disasters” (Sylves, 2008, 50). In addition, the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 empowered the
president to provide different levels of federal aid by creating two classes of disasters-major and emergency (May, 2005, 22). The act also increased the level of aid available
and made nonprofit entities eligible for federal assistance. In spite of financial resources
made available by Congress, disaster preparedness and response programs though various
agencies remained fragmented.

II. Civil Defense versus Natural Disasters
While the focus of policy responsibility for natural disaster relief and prevention
was increasingly seen as federal, disaster relief policy took another turn with the accident
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at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near Middletown, Pennsylvania, in 1978.
The incident brought to attention the lack of adequate off-site preparedness around
commercial nuclear power plants, as well as showed the role the federal government
played in regulating safety. On June 19, 1978 President Carter submitted Reorganization
Plan No. 3 to Congress with the aim of establishing a single entity to serve as the sole
federal agency responsible for “anticipating, preparing for, and responding to major civil
emergencies” (Sylves, 2008, 56). The act created the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), which reports directly to the President, and assumed the functions of
the National Fire Prevention Control Administration, the Federal Insurance
Administration, the Federal Broadcast System, the Civil Defense Preparedness Agency,
the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, and the Federal Preparedness Agency.
In addition, FEMA also took responsibility of oversight of the Earthquake
Hazards Reduction Program, coordination of dam safety, and the natural and nuclear
disaster warning system. The additional responsibilities include assistance to
communities in the development of readiness plans for severe weather-related
emergencies, and the coordination of preparedness and planning to reduce the
consequences of major terrorist incidents (Bea, 2002, 25).
A second executive order, 12148, mandated the reassignment of agencies,
programs, and personnel into this newly established organization and established the
Federal Emergency Management Council composed of FEMA, the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB), and others as determined by the President (Bea,
2002, 28). FEMA’s primary role was to serve as the single point of contact for all federal
emergency preparedness, planning, response and mitigation activities. The varying
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functions that FEMA would be required to take charge of made establishing effective
leadership one of the focal points of FEMA policy.
One of the main challenges facing FEMA as a new organization was to create an
environment conducive to its own organizational culture, bureaucratic processes and
identity, irrespective of the various agencies now under its leadership. Perhaps because of
this, President Carter appointed John Macy, a member of his cabinet and the former head
of the Office of Personnel Management, as the first director of FEMA. Establishing
coherence and unity in FEMA was inherently difficult due to the variety of potential
political problems posed by the reorganization of preexisting program responsibilities. In
consolidating previously separate programs, the new agency entered a jurisdictional
minefield that involved 23 congressional committees and subcommittees claiming
responsibility over some portion of FEMA’s policy jurisdiction (Haddow and Bullock,
2006, 6).
In 1982, President Reagan appointed Louis O. Guiffrida as director of FEMA.
General Guiffrida, (a friend of Edward Messe, one of Reagan’s closest advisers) whose
background was in training and terrorism preparedness at the state government level,
reorganized FEMA according to administration policies. As a result, emphasis was
placed on government preparedness for a nuclear attack (Haddow and Bullock, 2006, 10).
Haddow and Bullock (2006) argue that resources and budget authority were both
realigned to enhance and elevate the national security preparedness of the agency at the
expense of natural disasters.
With this new direction, state directors of emergency management who had
lobbied for the creation of FEMA witnessed a decline in both their authority and federal
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funding (Haddow and Bullock, 2006, 11). In addition, the fire service community was in
an uproar as General Guiffrida’s reorganization measures diminished the authority of the
U.S. Fire Administration by making it part of FEMA’s Directorate of Training and
Education. Guiffrida and top aides eventually resigned in response to charges levied in
congressional hearings that included the misuse of government funds (Haddow and
Bullock, 2006, 8).
President Reagan next selected General Julius W. Becton, Jr. to replace Guiffrida
as director of FEMA. Becton, a retired Army Lieutenant General, had been the director of
the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in the State Department, and thus might be
viewed as a compromised candidate of sorts by those pushing for a focus on natural
disasters. Still, Becton did not neglect the civil defense dimension, expanding the duties
of FEMA to include off-site cleanup of chemical stockpiles on military bases (Haddow
and Bullock, 2006, 8). Because FEMA had minimal technical expertise to administer the
cleanup program, it came to depend on the Army for implementation, greatly limiting its
role in science, while also lessening attention to local emergency management operations
(Haddow and Bullock, 2006, 8).
Much as his predecessor had, Becton ranked earthquake, hurricane, and flood
programs near the bottom of FEMA policy priorities. The congressional response was as
expected; Senator Albert Gore (D-TN) raised questions regarding FEMA’s
responsibilities as leading agency for the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction
Program (NEHRP). Gore, as member of the Senate Commerce Committee, urged FEMA
to collaborate with its federal, state, and local partners on natural hazards planning
(Haddow and Bullocark 2006, 8). In response to Gore’s suggestions and to the concerns

30

regarding non-attack preparedness during the final years of Reagan’s administration, the
Meese Memorandum (Executive Order 12656) was signed in 1986 delegating the
response role to federal agencies depending on the type of disaster.
Congress followed up the following year by passing the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Act (PL 93-288) in 1988, in an effort to redirect FEMA
towards prevention and relief of natural disasters. The act provided authority for the
federal government to respond to disasters and emergencies in order to provide assistance
to save lives and protect public health, safety, and property (Bea, 2002, 6).
Still, at the end of the 1980s, FEMA suffered from severe problems, disparate
leadership and conflicts with its partners at the state and local level over agency spending
and priorities (Haddow and Bullock, 2006, 9). In 1989, two devastating natural disasters
served as punctuating events that called the continued existence of FEMA into question.
In September, Hurricane Hugo landed in North Carolina and South Carolina, causing
more than $15 billion of damages and 85 deaths. Later that year, the Loma Prieta
earthquake struck the San Francisco Bay Area of California, killing 63, injuring 3,757,
and leaving approximately 8,000 to 12,00 people homeless ( Haddow and Bullock, 2006,
10). . FEMA’s response to these disasters was slow. The agency waited on the
bureaucratic process to work and for the governors to decide what to do before acting.
For example, Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC), acting as an entrepreneur personally called
FEMA’s director, asked for help, but the agency moved slowly (Bullock, et al., 2006, 6).
As a result, federal assistance arrived days later than it might have.
Summarizing FEMA’s problems, a 1991 GAO study found FEMA was “not
prepared to take over the state’s role as immediate responder when the state’s resources
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were overwhelmed and had placed little emphasis on preparing for long-term recovery in
the aftermath of a disaster” (GAO Report, 1991,43 ). The report criticized FEMA’s
actions during the response to the two 1989 disasters as “inefficient and uncoordinated”
(GAO-RCED-91-43, 66). The report largely focused on the administrative problems
within the agency, such as the high turnover rate among agency personnel and FEMA’s
problems of coordination with state and local agencies.
In April of 1992, the Federal Response Plan was developed as an answer to
FEMA’s problems. The purpose of the Federal Response Plan (known simply as the
Plan) was to address the consequences of any disaster or emergency in which there was
need for federal response assistance under the authorities of the Stafford Act (Bea, 2002,
18). The Plan used a functional approach to group the types of federal assistance that
states are likely to need under Emergency Support Functions (ESF): public works and
engineers, transportation, information and planning, communications, health and medical
services, fire fighting, urban search and rescue, mass care, resource support, hazardous
material, and energy.
Primary governmental agencies charged with implementing function-based
responses are selected to head the ESFs based on authority, resources, and capabilities.
The primary purpose of the Plan was “to establish fundamental assumptions and policies
as well as establish a concept of operations that provided an interagency coordination
mechanism to facilitate the immediate delivery of federal response assistance” (PL 93288).
The Plan applied to all federal government disaster response activities, but did not
address recovery assistance. According to Hogue and Bea (2006), Sylves and Cumming
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(2004), and Bea (2002), the most important element of the Plan was to supplement state
and local government response efforts. ESFs were to be implemented via coordination
between the federal officers and state officials, who would work to identify specific
response requirements and provide necessary federal response assistance based on stateidentified priorities. The plan assigned roles to 27 federal agencies and the American Red
Cross in the event of a large-scale disaster. In addition, relief efforts could be activated
whether or not a presidential declaration of a major disaster was in effect, essentially
bypassing the White House (Sylves and Cumming, 2004, 15).
The Plan was put to the test in 1992, when Hurricane Andrew hit south Florida as
a category 4 Hurricane and the central Louisiana coast as a category 3 Hurricane.
FEMA’s response was harshly criticized with detractors who noted that “thousands of
homeless Floridians searched days for food, water, and help while relief efforts lagged”
(Davis in Hogue and Bea, 2006, 17). FEMA’s inability to respond was due to the fact that
nobody at the local, state, or federal level understood the severity of the damage, and
failed to rapidly assess the extent of the damage, and to deploy essential relief (Mener,
2007, 28). This suggests in essence, that the Plan was not well developed into an
operational strategy. In an attempt to address the anemic response, President George H.
W. Bush bypassed FEMA and sent in a task force led by Secretary of Transportation
Andrew H. Card, Jr., to coordinate the response (Schneider, 1995, 81).
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III. Restructuring FEMA
FEMA’s poor performance during the response to Hurricane Andrew led
Congress to call for an evaluation and reformation of the agency. As a result, Congress
instructed FEMA to contract with the National Academy of Public Administration
(NAPA) for “a comprehensive and objective study of the Federal, state and local
government’s capabilities to respond promptly and effectively to major natural disasters
occurring in the United States” (Cong. Rec., 1992, 63). The congressionally mandated
NAPA report was issued in February of 1993. The report addressed the viability of
FEMA and stated that “emergency management and FEMA are overseen by too many
congressional committees, none of which has either the interest [in] or a comprehensive
overview of the topic to assure that coherent federal policy is developed and
implemented” (NAPA Report 1993, 2). To be successful, the agency would need a more
coherent legislative charter, greater funding flexibility, and sustained support for building
an effective agency and a national emergency management system response (NAPA
Report, 1993, 2).
After months of testimony, the GAO issued a report in July of 1993
recommending that, “in order to underscore the commitment of the President,
responsibility for catastrophic disaster preparedness and response should be placed with a
key official in the White House” (GAO Report, 1993, 2). The report noted that:
a disaster unit is needed to provide the White House and the Director of FEMA
with information, analysis, and technical support to improve federal decisionmaking on helping state and local governments before, during and after
catastrophic disasters . . . the FEMA directorates whose resources would form the
disaster unit—National Preparedness and State and Local Programs and
Support—have historically not worked well together.
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The report concluded by suggesting that major reorganization was needed (GAO Report,
1993, 3). These recommendations were considered by President Clinton as well as
Congress, but instead of reorganizing the whole disaster response system, they made
minor administrative and structural changes (Miskel, 2006, 88). These changes were
made because FEMA had high rates of turnover among agency personnel, as well as
problems dealing with states and local agencies (Waugh, 2000, 28).
In 1993, President Clinton appointed James L. Witt as the new Director of FEMA.
With a strong interest in matters of disaster policy, President Clinton helped improve both
the substance and image of FEMA operations. As part of the National Performance
Review (NPR) process, in association with the administration’s efforts to reinvent
government, the NPR recommended
shifting FEMA’s resources and focus from preparedness for nuclear war to
preparation for, and response to, all disasters; developing a more anticipatory and
customer-driven response to catastrophic disasters; creating results-oriented
incentives to reduce the costs of disaster; and developing a skilled management
team among political appointees and career staff. (Hogue and Bea, 2006, 17)

As the director, Witt reorganized the agency in accordance with many of the
NAPA and GAO recommendations (Hogue and Bea, 2006, 17). For Schneider (2008,
42), Witt’s focus on “all hazards” was at the forefront of FEMA’s mission and redirected
the agency’s focus from nuclear attacks to natural disasters. Inside the agency, Witt
reached out to all employees and implemented customer service training; he also
reorganized and supported the use of new technologies to deliver disaster services and
placed an emphasis on mitigation and risk avoidance (Haddow and Bullock, 2006, 10).
Outside the agency, he strengthened the relationships with state and local emergency
managers and built new ones with the House Armed Services, Veteran Affairs, Energy
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and Commerce committees, the Clinton administration, and the media (Haddow and
Bullock, 2006, 10). His relationship with Congress was exemplified in the laws that were
passed that focus on preparedness. For example, the disaster relief legislation passed in
1996 and 1998 improved hazards mitigation and relocation assistance as well as
established an advisory commission to provide advice and recommendation.
According to Bea (2006), under Witt, FEMA was able to develop its first new
mission statement in ten years, which emphasized comprehensive, risk-based, all hazards
management program of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. In addition,
FEMA’s future management decisions and programs were based on six goals related to
the new mission. The first goal was to create an emergency management partnership with
other federal agencies, state and local governments, volunteer organizations, and the
private sector. The second goal was to establish, in concert with FEMA’s partners, a
comprehensive, risk-based, and all-hazards approach. This goal was to be followed by
making hazard mitigation the foundation of the national emergency management system.
The fourth goal was to provide a rapid and effective response to any disaster. The fifth
goal was to strengthen state and local emergency management, as well as revitalize the
agency and develop a more effective and involved cadre of FEMA managers, permanent
employees, and disaster reservists (Bea, 2006, 2). Overall, FEMA’s “dominant
philosophy became one of customer service” where the focus was on citizens either
preparing for or recovering from disasters (Anderson, 2001, 71).
Witt’s reorganization, in accordance with many of the NAPA and GAO
recommendations, established three functional directorates to correspond with major
phases of emergency management: a Preparedness, Training, and Exercises Directorate, a
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Response and Recovery Directorate, and a Mitigation Directorate. The Preparedness
Directorate funds state and local disaster planning as well as coordinates federal
interagency planning for disaster response and continuity of government in the event of a
federal government crisis (CRS, 2004; FEMA 2006, 3). In addition, the Preparedness
Directorate relies on a systemic conceptualization of emergency management to identify
threats, hazards, and vulnerabilities (Sylves, 2008, 23). For example, the standards used
also known as the EMAP standards are based on the National Fire Protection Association
1600 Standards. These standards were developed by state, local and federal emergency
management practitioners in order to improve emergency coordination and response
(Sylves, 2008, 23).
First, the Response Directorate coordinates federal operational and logistical disaster
response capability needed to save and sustain lives, minimize suffering, and protect
property in a timely and effective manner in communities that become overwhelmed by
natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other emergencies (CRS, 2004, 22; FEMA, 2006).
The response segment is often the most dramatic phase of the disaster cycle because it
entails applying intelligence to lessen the effects or consequences of an incident (Sylves,
2008).
Second, the Recovery Directorate ensures that individuals and communities affected
by disasters of all sizes are able to return to normal function with minimal suffering and
disruption of services (FEMA, 2006, 3). This stage of the disaster cycle is the most
expensive phase since it involves restoration, rebuilding, and a return to normalcy. At this
phase, decisions regarding the recovery process are made at the local level of government
(Sylves, 2008).
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Finally,the Mitigation Directorate defines hazard mitigation as sustained action
taken to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people and their property from hazards and
their effects (FEMA, 2006, 1). The Mitigation Division is comprised of three branches:
the Risk Analysis, the Risk Reduction and the Risk Insurance (CRS, 2004, 22; FEMA,
2006, 3). This state of the disaster cycle requires partners outside the traditional
emergency management system. An example is the partnership of land-use planners with
construction and building officials as well as with community leaders. The tools of
mitigation include hazard identification and mapping and building codes (Purpura, 207,
284).
To facilitate inter-agency cooperation, Congress amended the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Act in 1993 to authorize a program for pre-disaster
mitigation and streamline the administration of disaster relief (Anderson, 2001). This
shift in prevention was due in part to disasters that transpired during the year (i.e. the
Great Midwest Flood and the bombing of the World Trade Center). Congress also
included the development of multi-agency Emergency Response Teams, Emergency
Support Teams, and Field Assessment Teams with the ability to respond to disasters
within four hours of occurrence (Anderson, 2001, 72). By working closely with the
interagency Catastrophic Disaster Response Group, which served as the focal point for
the Federal Response Plan, Witt promoted a risk-based, all-hazards emergency
management system and directed regional offices to work closely with their state and
local counterparts on a regular basis (Anderson, 2001, 73; FEMA, 1994).
Despite the fact that the agency made significant improvements, FEMA was not
free from challenges. During this time, FEMA was strongly criticized for not addressing
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special needs populations during disasters (FEMA, 1994). Studies by Daniels and ClarkDaniels (2000, 35) and Hogue and Bea (2006, 18) found that FEMA still had to improve
in two areas: financial management and the disaster declaration process. These two areas
of improvement were put to test following the Great Midwest Floods of 1993. The
recovery phase of this disaster offered opportunity for mitigation actions. FEMA used
this window of opportunity to change the focus of post disaster recovery by initiating the
largest voluntary buyout and relocation program to date in an effort to move people out
of the floodplain and out of harm’s way (Haddow and Bullock, 2006, 11). The following
year, FEMA faced another challenge: the Northridge, California Earthquake of 1994.
This earthquake tested the new streamlined approaches and technological advancements
in service delivery (Haddow and Bullock, 2006, 12). FEMA’s proactive response and
coordination with states and local governments was positive as well as highlighted
suggestions made by the NPR. The agency’s performance in the aftermath of the
earthquake demonstrated that it had transformed itself from a passive agency to a harddriving, problem solving organization with a much deeper commitment to serve its
citizens (Johnston, 2000, 136). In the late 1990s, FEMA faced several more natural
disasters, including tornadoes, ice storms, hurricanes, floods, wildfires, and drought, but
none were actually catastrophic in size or strength (Miskel, 2006, 86) and it responded
positively since it was able to develop a national and regional cadre of skilled, dedicated
emergency management specialists (Johnston, 2000, 136).
Although the focus on preparedness allowed the agency to center on natural
disaster, Congress in 1993 included a joint resolution in the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA), calling on FEMA to develop an early detection and warning
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system in response to potential terrorist use of chemical or biological agents or weapons
(Cong. Rec., 1993, 22). Congressional concern was due in part to the 1993 bombing of
the World Trade Center. In 1994, Congress repealed the Federal Civil Defense Act of
1950 and all remnants of civil defense authority were transferred to Title VI of the
Stafford Act. The end result was that civil defense was now included in the all-hazards
approach to preparedness (DHS, 2007). The Oklahoma City bombing of 1995
“represented the new phase in the evolution of emergency management,” raising the issue
of America’s preparedness for terrorism events and shifting presidential and
congressional attention back toward civil defense (Haddow and Bullock (2006, 11).
These events tested FEMA and set the stage for interagency competition for control of
terrorism. Instead of a resolution, the Nunn-Lugar legislation of 1995 left the question of
implementation open, giving responsibility to the Department of Defense because it had
the necessary knowledge and assets (Haddow and Bullock, 2006, 12). According to
Haddow and Bullock (2006), terrorism was part of the all-hazard approach to emergency
management advocated by FEMA, even though they never took a leadership role as the
first responder to a terrorism incident. Because both the resources and technologies
needed to address issues such as biochemical warfare and weapons of mass destruction
were far beyond the reach of FEMA, they deferred to others (Haddow and Bullock, 2006,
12).
In 1998, the gap in emergency management policies and practices led the United
States Commission on National Security in the 21st Century to begin, “a comprehensive
reexamination of the U.S. national security policies and processes in view of the changed
international environment and technological, social, and intellectual changes of the late
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20th Century” (Hogue and Bea, 2006, 19). Co-chaired by Senators Gary Hart (D-CO) and
Warren B. Rudman (R-NH) and chartered by the Department of Defense, the committee
(also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission), issued three reports between 1999 and
February 2001. The reports had some fifty recommendations for governmental changes,
ranging from revamping science and education, to the reorganization of the congress and
its role in national security affairs (United States Commission on National Security/21st
Century, 2001). Another recommendation included a proposal to create a Cabinet-level
National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA). This agency would have responsibility for
“planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in
homeland security” (Bea 2002, 22). FEMA was considered “a key building block in this
effort” accompanied by three federal agencies “on the front line of border security”- the
Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the Border Patrol (United States Commission on
National Security/21st Century, 2001). They envisioned the NHSA as having three
directorates-Prevention, Critical Infrastructure, and Emergency Preparedness and
Response (DHS, 2009). Legislation toward this end was introduced by Representative
Mac Thornberry (R-TX), which held hearings but never reported a bill(Hogue and Bea,
2006, 19).
President George W. Bush reorganized FEMA in 2001 and appointed Joseph
Allbaugh, who had no prior experience in disaster management, as the director. Allbaugh
had been Bush’s chief of staff when he was Governor of Texas and the National
Campaign Manager of Bush’s 2000 election campaign (Robert, 2006, 75). The Bush
administration’s goal was to reorient the agency in a new direction by refocusing its
efforts on civil defense and counterterrorism (Robert, 2006, 75). Meanwhile, the Office
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of Management and Budget (OMB) emphasized three objectives for homeland security:
counterterrorism, defense against WMD, and the protection of infrastructure (Robert,
2006). To accomplish this goal, President Bush established a Counterterrorism and
National Preparedness Policy Coordinating Committee composed of four working
groups: Continuity of Federal Operations, Counterterrorism and Security, Preparedness
and WMD, and Information Infrastructure Protection and Assurance (Robert, 2006, 77).
President Bush directed Allbaugh to form the National Domestic Preparedness Office
(NDPO) with the responsibility to “coordinate all federal programs dealing with weapons
of mass destruction consequence management” (Allbaugh 2001, 1). In June 2001,
Allbaugh announced the functional realignment of FEMA, reporting that “the existing
organization is not the best fit for the evolving mission of this agency nor does it support
President Bush’s restructuring and streamlining goals” (Allbaugh 2001, 1). For Allbaugh,
the proposed focus on weapons of mass destructions would adversely affect FEMA’s
ability to respond to disaster.
Even though Allbaugh sought to “flatten the organization where possible; reduce
the number of organizations reporting directly to the office of the Director; and
consolidate like functions” during the reorganization process, the functional realignment
of FEMA created several new organizations, including the NDPO, and combined and
modified other parts of the organization (Allbaugh, 2001, 1). Moreover, President Bush
came to depend heavily on FEMA to address human-caused or technology-caused
calamities as well as natural disasters (Burns, 2006, 19).
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, there was a near-universal
consensus within the federal government that homeland security required a major
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reassessment, increased funding, and administrative reorganization. In October 8, 2001,
President Bush established the Office of Homeland Security via Executive Order 13228
to “work with Executive Departments and agencies to develop and coordinate the
implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from
terrorist threats and attacks”(DHS, 2006, 4). This directive placed the Office of
Homeland Security within the Executive Office of the President and made the Director
the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. President Bush chose Pennsylvania
Governor Tom Ridge to lead the new office (DHS, 2006, 4).
During his 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush announced the
creation of the USA Freedom Corps to promote a culture of service, citizenship, and
responsibility in America (White House, 2002). Under the Freedom Corps initiative, the
White House established the Citizen Corps within FEMA to “engage individual citizens
through education, training, and volunteer service to make communities better prepared
to prevent, protect, respond, and recover from all hazards” (DHS, 2006, 8). Along the
same line, President Bush in March 2002 established another executive order-13260creating the Homeland Security Advisory Council to advise the President on Homeland
Security matters (White House, 2003).
On March 12, 2002, the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) was
created to communicate with the American public and safety officials using a threatbased color system, so protective measures could be implemented to reduce the
likelihood or impact of an attack (DHS, 2006). According to the Homeland Security
National Preparedness Task Force (2006), the Bush Administration also developed a
number of strategic documents and statements that outlined the President’s vision for
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protecting the nation. Those strategies included the National Security Strategy, the
National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS), and the National Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Homeland Security National Preparedness Task Force,
2006, 26). As these strategies were being developed, Congress pushed for more
substantial reorganization of the Federal agencies involved in Homeland Security while
the President submitted his own plan for the creation of a homeland security department
on June 6, 2002 (Kettl, 2004, 20). The September 11, 2001 attacks and actions taken by
President Bush with the acquiescence of Congress, shifted disaster relief attention to civil
defense and more precisely as a matter of national security.
After intense debate, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(HSA), which established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including the
Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) Directorate (CRS, 2005). Title V of HSA
transferred the functions, personnel, resources, and authority of six existing entities, the
largest of which was FEMA, into EPR (CRS, 2005). Meanwhile, section 507 of HSA
specifically charged FEMA with “carrying out its mission to reduce the loss of life and
property and protect the Nation from all hazards by leading and supporting the nation in a
comprehensive, risk-based emergency management program” (Vina, 2002, 3). These
supplemental requirements added bureaucratic layers to the flow of emergency
information as well as disrupted the organizational chart of the agency (Schneider, 2006).
Despire the fact that FEMA was transferred into DHS, “it was not defined as an
autonomous or distinct entity within its parent organization” (Hogue and Bea, 2006, 20).
Although the initial work of the department focused on addressing the threat of domestic
terrorism, the DHS mandate encompassed the full range of disasters and attacks (Hogue
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and Bea, 2006, 20). Within this perspective, all-hazards preparedness soon became a top
priority, albeit a priority with a focus on terrorism.
In January 2003, the President named Tom Ridge as the first Secretary of the
DHS. Ridge obtained increased budgetary authority and control over many of the
agencies involved in homeland security (Cong. Rec., 2006, 55). The DHS inherited
approximately 200,000 employees from 22 federal agencies and an initial budget of $37
billion (DHS, 2006). On March 1, 2003, FEMA’s functions were transferred to the DHS.
Secretary Ridge used his reorganization authority to consolidate organizational units and
reallocate functions within DHS. Some of the changes such as select grant under Section
502 and 503 of the Homeland Security Act were consolidated within the Office of State
and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, an office that would report
directly to the Secretary (DHS, 2004). In December 2003, Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-8: National Preparedness (HSPD-8) was issued. The directive
defined preparedness as encompassing, “threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks,
major disasters, and other emergencies” (Homeland Security National Preparedness Task
Force, 2006, 28). With this broad directive, the DHS assessed how federal, state, local,
tribal, and private sector resources worked together to address emergencies. The
assessment led to the development of a new National Response Plan (NRP) and the
National Incident Management System (NIMS) (Homeland Security National
Preparedness Task Force, 2006, 28). The NRP was designed to establish framework for
how federal agencies would interact with each other and with state, local and tribal
governments, and also with the private sector and nongovernment organizations. This
plan defines and specifies roles and responsibilities for domestic incident prevention,
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preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery activities (Goodman, et al., 2007, 267).
The NIMS ensures that all level of government works from the same playbook during a
disaster. It main principle is one incident, one commander, no matter how many agencies
send help (Cooper and Block, 2007, 278). The federal government requires local
government to adopt NIMS in order to be eligible for federal preparedness grant.
FEMA’s organizational components (especially preparedness) came to the
forefront under Ridge’s successor Michael Chertoff. Before joining DHS, Chertoff served
as judge on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Upon taking office in February 2005,
Chertoff initiated a systematic evaluation of the Department’s operations, policies and
structures (DHS, 2005). This initiative, known as the Second Stage Review (2SR)
resulted in a six-point agenda: (1) to increase preparedness with a focus on catastrophic
events; (2) to strengthen border security and interior enforcement and reform immigration
processes; (3) to harden transportation security without sacrificing mobility; (4) to
enhance information sharing with U.S. government and private sector partners; (5) to
improve DHS financial human resources, procurement, and information technology
management; and finally (6) to realign the DHS’s organization to maximize mission
performance (Homeland Security National Preparedness Task Force, 2006,30). The goal
of this six-point agenda was to increase the DHS’s ability to prepare, prevent, and
respond to terrorist attacks and other emergencies. The DHS’s agenda focused primarily
on terrorism/civil defense to the exclusion of natural disasters. This review also resulted
in the creation of a new Directorate of Preparedness (DP). Most functions originally
housed in the EPR Directorate were transferred to this new directorate. Meanwhile, the
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remaining components of EPR and FEMA focused on response and recovery, and not on
preparation (CRS-Report RL 33064).
According to Hogue and Bea (2006, 21), Chertoff’s implementation of the
reorganization proposal was not universally accepted. The National Emergency
Management Association (NEMA), composed of state and county level emergency
directors, criticized the proposed reorganization. The association noted that it would be a
mistake to separate disaster planning from response. In the midst of all these concerns,
Congress approved the division of responsibility of CEM functions but did not enact the
legislation to change the structure of FEMA (Hogue and Bea 2006, 22). It addressed the
Administration’s reorganization plan during the FY 2006 appropriation process, which
was underway at the time Chertoff’s initiative was announced (Hogue and Bea 2006, 22).
Since Congress did not enact legislation to change the structure of FEMA,
Director Michael Brown, who took office in 2003, held the title of Under Secretary for
Federal Emergency Management and reported directly to the Secretary (Hogue and Bea
2006, 22). He oversaw three divisions (Response, Mitigation, and Recovery), ten regional
offices, and numerous other components (GAO, 2006, 614). In addition, emergency
preparedness functions were vested in DP, which he also headed with no experience in
emergency management (Miskel, 2006, 30). By shifting many preparedness tasks to the
DP, the Bush Administration left FEMA as a response agency for rescue and clean-up
(Shane, 2005).
The fears expressed about FEMA’s separation of disaster planning from response
came true once Hurricane Katrina, a Category Three storm, struck the Gulf Coast on
August 28, 2005. Katrina made landfall in Southeast Louisiana and the Louisiana-
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Mississippi border, causing severe and catastrophic damage all along the Gulf Coast. The
storm destroyed the cities of Bay St. Louis, Waveland, and Biloxi/Gulfport in Mississippi
as well as Mobile, Alabama, and Slidell, Louisiana (Miskel, 2006, 94). The levees that
separated Lake Pontchartrain and several canals from New Orleans were breached a few
days later, flooding eighty percent of the city and many areas of neighboring parishes for
weeks (Freedberg and Syndney, 2005, 3). An estimated 1,836 people lost their lives in
Hurricane Katrina and subsequent floods, making it the deadliest U.S. hurricane since the
1928 Okeechobee Hurricane (Miskel, 2006, 94). In addition, the storm is estimated to
have been responsible for $81.2 billion in damage, making it the costliest national
disaster in U.S. history (Miskel, 2006, 95). Under the leadership of Michael Brown,
FEMA performed miserably during Hurricane Katrina.
Major problems developed during the governmental response to Katrina largely
because emergency management officials at the local, state, and federal levels did not
follow federal guidelines, procedures and processes (Schneider, 2007, 1). For example,
the ODP, whose duty is to pay exclusive attention to state and local first responders such
as police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel, failed to communicate
and coordinate response teams. Since ODP money could only be used for terrorism
preparedness, emergency managers, local officials, and first responders in Louisiana and
Mississippi could not access funds for natural disaster preparedness (Miskel, 2006, 98).
According to Schneider (2007, 9), FEMA exemplified several “bureaucratic pathologies”
during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Ambiguous mission and personnel problems,
faltering mobilization, bureaucratic rigidity, and red tape all contributed to FEMA’s poor
response (Schneider, 2007, 12-20). Hurricane Katrina revealed FEMA’s weak
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organizational structure and leadership. In regard to disaster relief policy, Hurricane
Katrina shifted the attention back to natural disasters. Therefore, this tragedy brings back
how disaster relief policy should be defined in the United States.

Conclusion
The preceding indicates that the history of civil defense and natural disaster
involves myriad policy and organizational changes. Those changes have been driven by a
variety of factors: (1) potential nuclear attacks, (2) devastating natural and man-made
disasters, (3) congressional mandates, and (4) the specific preferences of presidential
administrations. As a punctuating event, Hurricane Katrina shifted and challenged the
policy process, actors, organizations, and institutions. Following its aftermath,
committees in both chambers of Congress and the Bush Administration conducted
investigations into governmental failures during the preparation for and response to
disaster. While DHS conducted an internal review and the White House assessed the role
of governmental response to Hurricane Katrina, Congress introduced legislation and held
hearings that dealt with disaster relief policy. Since congressional committees serve as
the legislative anchor for the subsystem, the following chapters map how they govern the
agenda of disaster relief policy over the post-war era.
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Chapter Four
Tracking Agenda Status
The preceding chapters discuss the historical development of disaster relief in the
U.S., and how this development vacillates between two fronts: civil defense and natural
disasters. Given that disasters are unpredictable with respect both to their occurrence and
their outcome, the government is left in a predicament about whether to act, when to act,
and what action to take to manage these disasters (Birkland, 1997; McEntire, 1998; Dara
et al. 2005). This chapter seeks to understand this shift by focusing on bill introductions
as the first of two ways in which Congress governs the agenda of disaster relief over the
post-war era. The purpose of this chapter is three-fold. First, I develop an indicator of the
institutional agenda by examining the ebb and flow of bill introductions in both the
House and the Senate over the post-war period in the policy areas of natural disaster and
civil defense. I provide a snapshot of the overall level of activity, as well as highlight
periods of increased salience in both policy areas. Second, I examine the composition of
legislation in an effort to decipher the topics that receive attention and the shift in issue
framing. Third, I examine the referral of legislation to highlight the dynamics of policy
jurisdiction. Examining referrals enables one to identify not only committee competition,
but also highlight periods of policy monopoly.
For ease of presentation, I break this mapping down into three sections--- civil
defense, disaster relief, and a conclusion that compares the two. Each section is guided by
three questions: “When did the issue get on the agenda?” “What facet of the issue
receives attention?” and “Who exercises jurisdictional control?”
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4.1. Mapping the Civil Defense Agenda
The data on legislative introductions were gathered using the Congressional Bills
Project, as well as the THOMAS search engine. Concurrent, joint resolutions, and public
bills were included in the counts. The Congressional Bills Project data were gathered
under two broad categories: civil defense and homeland security. The database specified
the examples of categories as “radiological emergency planning,” “civil reserve air fleet,”
“federal civil defense act,” “effect of limited nuclear warfare,” “federal fallout shelter
construction,” “ civil defense air raid shelter program,” “ civil defense for national
survival,” and “ civil air patrol.” A THOMAS subject search using the key term “civil
defense” and “Homeland Security and related functions” was conducted in order to
double check bills introduced between 1973 and 2005.
The civil defense search produced 298 bills introduced between 1947 and 2005
(171 in the House and 127 in the Senate).
Figure 4.1: Number of House and Senate Bills Introduced on the subject of Civil
Defense from 1947-2005
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Figure 4.1 indicates that interest in the issue has lessened over time and across the
House and the Senate. There has been more activity in the House than in the Senate, and
the patterns of activity across both chambers have also differed. Interest in the House
grows at a steady pace and peaks in 1957, 1963, 1977 and 2004. The sharp peak in 1953
could be explained by President Eisenhower’s decision to support a mass evacuation
policy instead of a shelter program initiated under the Truman administration. Partly
responsible for the increase was the denotation of a hydrogen bomb by the Soviet Union
in 1953, which renewed congressional attention to civil defense matters. The interest as
it relates to the jump seems to be associated with congressional intent to establish a
civilian department within the Department of Defense, known as the Department of Civil
Defense, to provide stockpiling, storage, and distribution of food supply to the civilian
population that would be evacuated from the devastated areas in the event of an attack on
the U.S. Unlike the House, the peak in Senate activity occurred in early 1953. The
activity surge appears to coincide with the passing of the Federal Civil Defense Act of
1950 that allocated significant funding for shelter initiatives. The Senate activity,
however, decreased after 1953 and regained a peak in 2005 following the attacks of
September 11, 2001.
The increase in activity in the House in 1977 coincides with the amendment of the
Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. The act allocated significant funding for shelter
initiative and placed the majority of the civil defense responsibilities on individual states.
The peak in 1979 prompted by the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant
corresponds with congressional demands that various civil defense agencies be combined
into one coherent agency in direct contact with the White House. There is a virtual
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absence of civil defense bills between 1991 and 1999, associated with the end of the Cold
War.
Civil defense again became prominent on the agenda corresponding with the
attacks of September 11, 2001. This increase in legislative activity in both chambers is no
doubt a product of the attack and produced the Homeland Security Act, which established
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as well as the Emergency Preparedness
and Response (EPR) directorate.
To try to approximate the dimension of attention civil defense receives, I have
developed a coding system based on bill titles and or summary remarks found in the
Congressional Bills Project and THOMAS. In view of the two broad categories, civil
defense and homeland security, bills coded Aid include legislation dealing with
appropriations for civil defense programs. Defense includes legislation that discusses the
establishment of a Federal Department of Civil Defense and other purposes. Insurance
includes legislation that discusses provisions/compensation to states and local
government in case of an attack, miscalculation or accident. Shelter contains legislation
that specifically seeks to address efforts to minimize casualties. Nuclear includes
legislation that discusses the study of special civil defense needs in areas which contain
significant elements of the United States’ strategic nuclear retaliatory forces. Air Patrol
includes legislation that discusses the establishment of a civil air patrol as a civilian
auxiliary. Radiological contains legislation that seeks to address the purchase by the
Federal Civil Defense Administrator of certain radiological detection instruments,
devices, and equipments. I chose these search terms to reflect the names of the categories
that appeared in the database.
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Figure 4.2 (House) and Figure 4.3 (Senate), explore the answer to the second
main research question: “What facet of the issue receives attention?”
Figure 4.2: Civil Defense Bill Content: House
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From 1947 to 1951, aid, air patrol, and defense received modest attention in these
immediate years following World War II. For the most part, in the House, most of the
civil defense related proposals centered on defense. Also in the House there seems to be
no attention to any particular issue in 1995. This is no surprise, since September 11,
2001, renewed attention considering mix of issues. In 2003, during the 108th Congress,
there is a slight shift in attention from defense to the topics of aid and insurance. Such a
shift is indicative of the damages incurred during 9/11.
Figure 4.3: Civil Defense Bill Content: Senate
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An examination of figure 4.3 suggests that between 1947 and 1959, the Senate
deals with a mix of issues similar to those of the House. The chart in figure 4.3 shows an
increase from 1947 reaching a peak in 1953, and the beginning of a decline in 1956. Civil
Defense disappears on the Senate agenda in 1963, picking up again in 1975. The issue
was non-existent on the Senate agenda, and also absent on the President’s agenda, which
is consistent with the President’s role in setting the foreign policy agenda. Upon his
assumption of office following Kennedy’s assassination, President Johnson marked the
beginning of his administration by dramatically cutting back funding of the nation’s civil
defense program. The cutback in funding not only affected the continuation of the
program, but civil defense issues also began to fall slowly from the institutional radar.
Typical of this lack of interest was the administration’s refusal to pressure Congress to
pass the Shelter Incentive Program, which proposed to provide every non-profit
institution with financial compensation for each shelter it built.
The Nixon administration redefined civil defense policy to include preparedness
for natural disasters. The redefined civil defense policy continued under the Ford, Carter,
Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations enshrined in the “dual-use preparedness
approach” in which civil defense funding could be used for natural disaster mitigation
and preparedness.
Between 1995 and 2001 the issue dropped off the agenda, and then received a
surge of attention following 9/11. The surge is associated with the pressing concern with
counter-terrorism as was the case in the House. It is worth noting that from 1946 until the
end of the analysis period, insurance is not addressed in the Senate. This might be due to
the broader discussion of disaster relief policy.
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Three observations stand out. First, the focus over time is one in which defense
dominates the discussion. Second, an increase in bill introduction activity is associated
with a more varied discussion. Third, the increase in bill introductions in 2003 is
associated with a mixture of concerns on the agenda in both chambers. This can partly be
explained by the salient event of 9/11 and the attention given to it by the two chambers.
Having observed how civil defense got on the institutional agenda, the next
question to examine is “Who exercises jurisdictional control?” Bill referrals are both a
means of maintaining control as well as a means of expanding jurisdiction (Worsham,
1997, 70). As King (1997) has documented, controlling referrals is essential to preserving
turf. Figures 4.4 and 4.5, map the referral of legislation in both the House and Senate.
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Figure 4.4: House Civil Defense Bill Referral: Committee Competition
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Figure 4.5: Senate Civil Defense Bill Referral: Committee Competition
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A review of figures 4.4 and 4.5 reveals that the civil defense policy domain in
both chambers conforms to the traditional dominant coalition scenario at times, with
periods of competition in the 1950s and the 1960s. As the destination of legislation in the
House, the Armed Services committee in 1950s and 1960s experienced competition in
which the Interior Committee, the Judiciary Committee, the Government Operation
Committee and Ways and Means act as rival venues. Most of the proposals during this
competition questioned the U.S. civil defense preparedness emergency management. By
1971, competition in the House is non-existent, indicating the decline in the level of
attention.
Like in the House, the Armed Services Committee in the Senate encounters
competition in the 1950s and 1960s, when some legislation is referred to the Public
Works Committee. This competition remains until 1965, when legislation is referred to
additional committees such as Banking, Judiciary, and Interior. However, competition
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vanishes after 1968 with sporadic appearance in 1977 and 1980. In addition, attention to
the issue disappears completely in the periods 1968 through 1974 and 1993 through 2001
It appears that the creation of FEMA, the provisions of 1980, the 1988 Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, the 2000 Disaster Mitigation
Act, and the attacks of September 11, 2001, all function as a shock to the system. In some
measure, we see that these interruptions are reflective of negative feedback because the
initial disruption becomes smaller as it works its way through time (Baumgartner and
Jones 1993, 6). Besides a minor degree of competition, the Armed Services Committee in
both chambers is the dominant venue for referrals throughout the epoch under study. To
reinforce the argument of a policy monopoly being secured by the Armed Services
committee, figures 4.4 and 4.5 present a Herfindahl index score of each chamber.
A Herfindahl index score is calculated by squaring the proportion of committees
holding referrals in the policy realm and then summing the squares of those proportions.
The result is an index score that ranges from zero to one. A score close to zero indicates
referrals are spread out among a large number of committee, while a score of one
indicates that a single committee holds all the referrals (Worsham, 2004). Indices were
constructed for each year in order to offer a longitudinal measure of referral competition
in both chambers. As figures 4.4 and 4.5 reveal, both chambers exhibit periods of perfect
monopoly.
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Figure 4.6: House Herfindahl Index: Turf Monopoly
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Figure 4.7: Senate Herfindahl Index: Turf Monopoly
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At the macro-level, we can conclude that the level of attention to civil defense and
the degree of committee competition was at its apex from 1947 to 1965. The decline in
the level of attention and committee competition over the next decades ushers the end of
the Cold War and the introduction of intensive precautionary measures during the
aftermath of a disaster. In the following section, I turn my attention to the natural disaster
agenda and compare its patterns of activity to that of civil defense.
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4.2. Mapping the Natural Disaster Agenda
As was the case for civil defense, the data on legislative introductions were
gathered using the Congressional Bills Project as well as the THOMAS search engine.
The Congressional Bills Project data were gathered under one main category-Domestic
Disaster Relief. The database specified examples of the main category of Domestic
Disaster Relief as “aid for flood disasters,” “national flood insurance reform,”
“earthquake preparedness,” “FEMA disaster planning and relief operations,” “FEMA
national fire academy training programs,” “SBA disaster loans, interest rate on disaster
loans,” “emergency credit extension to farmers in disaster areas,” “hurricane protection
projects,” “drought relief,” “establishment of a national fire academy.” A THOMAS
subject search using the key term “disaster” was conducted in order to double check bills
introduced between 1973 and 2005 of the Congressional Bills Project.
The search produced 1,701 bills, 1,252 in the House and 449 in the Senate. Figure
4.8 tracks the number of bills introduced on the subject of disaster relief.
Figure 4.8: Number of House and Senate Bills Introduced on the subject of Natural
Disaster from 1947-2005
Natural Disaster Bill Introductions, 1947-2005
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As figure 4.8 indicates, disaster relief emerges on the agenda of both chambers
after 1947. By 1955, the frequency of bill introduction on natural disaster increased in
both chambers. That attention is coupled with the passing of the 1956 Federal Flood
Insurance Act that provides federal disaster relief insurance and reinsurance. The Senate
experienced a gradual decline in 1963 but rose gradually between 1965 and 1971. As
compared to the Senate, activity in the House remains relatively active for the next five
years. This surge of activity in the 1960s corresponds with the shift from viewing disaster
as an Act of God to a nonstructural mitigation; thus, denoting the use of wetlands to
buffer against flooding as well as the use of landscaping to protect structures from
flooding or wildfires (Sylves, 2008, 51). This shift in view is also due in part to the series
of flooding in California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada and hurricanes in Florida,
Louisiana and Mississippi. In addition, the surge in activity might be attributed to
President Nixon’s administration’s poor performance in the aftermath of Hurricane
Camille in August 1969 (Sylves, 2008, 52).
The flow of Congressional activities in 1973 concurs with the series of
devastating tornadoes that hit six Midwestern States. This stream of activities echoed the
need to add individual and family assistance to the disaster relief program. This
consideration was coupled with the passing of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974. This
expanded relief assistance to individual disaster victims, offered assistance for the
reconstruction of public facilities, and authorized the President to provide economic
recovery assistance after the period of emergency aid and replacement of essential
facilities and services. Although Congress passed the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, it
never funded it and the act was repealed in 1998 (Bea, 2005).
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By passing the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Congress advocated a multi-hazard,
or an all hazard approach, to emergency management, thus signaling the diminution of
civil defense issues, funding, and concerns in the realm of domestic emergency
management. This decrease of attention in civil defense continued for twenty more years
until the Federal Civil Defense Act was repealed in 1994 (Sylves, 2008). By repealing the
Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, all remnants of civil defense authority were
transferred to Title VI of the Stafford Act. The Stafford Act gave FEMA the
responsibility to coordinate a comprehensive emergency preparedness system for all
types of disasters. In addition, Title VI ended all Armed Services Committee oversight
over FEMA and the money authorized by the Civil Defense Act was reallocated to
natural disaster and all hazard programs (Sylves, 2008).
The Senate bill introductions follow a slightly different pattern than the House.
From 1975 to 1999, Senate legislative activities declined steadily, while the House
experienced fluctuations in the sense that its activities declined slightly in 1987, but
increased in 1993 before then decreasing in 1995. The House activities continued to
fluctuate until 2000. The Senate’s lack of activities between 1979 and 1989 reflect their
concern about the use of disaster authority for responding to non-natural disaster or
emergencies, such as managing the Cuban refugee influx and the Three Mile Island
incident (Figure 3.6), (Haddow and Bullock, 2006, 6). This ebb and flow of activity in
both chambers reflect the public outrage over the 1978 Three Mile Island Incident, the
creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency in 1979, the 1988 Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, and finally the 2000 Disaster
Mitigation Act. After FEMA’s poor response in the aftermath of disasters that occurred
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between 1989 and 1999, congressional activities did not increase radically. Bills
introduced in both chambers during this time period centered on the reorganization of
FEMA. It is not until the end of the 1999 that we see a noticeable surge in legislative
activities. This surge overlaps with the passing of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000,
which modifies the Stafford Act by establishing a national program for pre-disaster
mitigation, streamlining administration of disaster relief, and controlling federal costs of
disaster assistance. Clearly, the extraordinary level of attention in both chambers between
2001 and 2003 is attributed to the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, there is a near-universal agreement
within both chambers that homeland security required a major re-assessment, an increase
in funding, and an administrative reorganization (Allbaugh, 2001, 1). The peak in
activities in both chambers mirror the push for more substantial reorganization of the
federal agencies involved in Homeland Security. This increase relates to the passing of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HAS), which establishes the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) including the Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR)
Directorate. In 2003, FEMA became part of DHS and in July 12, 2005, DHS was
reorganized with FEMA as an independent agency within the Department. Given
FEMA’s poor performance during and in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in August
2005, it is reasonable to see an increase in legislative activities.
To determine which area of natural disaster receives attention, I developed a
coding instrument by coding legislation based on bill titles and or summary remarks
found in the Congressional Bills Project and THOMAS. Bills coded insurance includes
legislation dealing with provisions for national insurance for victims of natural disasters.
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Earthquake includes legislation that discusses existing building and infrastructure
structures, which protect occupants against seismic forces. Fire, Snowstorms, Hurricane,
Flood, Tornado, and Drought legislation discusses damages and assistance measures for
affected peoples. Aid includes legislation that discusses response plans of states and local
government affected by natural disasters. Loans contain legislation that addresses
government financed loans to help not only small businesses, but also individuals,
businesses of all sizes and nonprofits reestablish after a natural disaster.
Figures 4.9 (House) and Figure 4.10 (Senate) illustrate the topics that receive
attention on the agenda in both chambers.
Figure 4.9: Natural Disaster Bill Content: House
Natural Disaster Bill Content: House
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A review of Figure 4.9 and 4.10 show that for the most part, both chambers place
attention on a mix of issues. Evident in both chambers, insurance issues dominate the
natural disaster agenda between 1963 and 1987. This is indicative of the overlapping
funding of civil defense and natural disaster in the policy domain. Despite the disastrous
magnitude of Hurricane Katrina, there is a slight increase of attention to the subject of
hurricane and flooding in both chambers.
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Figure 4.10: Natural Disaster Bill Content: Senate
Natural Disaster Bill Content: Senate
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In essence, as Figures 4.9 and 4.10 indicate, the study time frame is characterized by an
increase in issue topics, with insurance receiving the majority of attention.
Overall, in both chambers, legislative introductions associated with natural
disaster policy appear to follow a cycle. Four observations stand out. First, the modest
increase of activities focus on preventive measures. Second, the increase of activities
surrounding bill introduction activity in both chambers are associated with the end of the
Cold War, as well as the debate over flooding as an Act of God or man-induced. Third,
the slight surge of bill introductions especially in the House coincide with the demand for
the coordination of disaster response, FEMA. And finally, the abrupt decline of bill
introductions is associated with a diversion toward issues related to counter-terrorism.
Having mapped the disaster relief agenda, the following figure examines the issue of
jurisdictional control.
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Figure 4.11: House Natural Disaster Bill Referral: Committee Competition
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A review of figures 4.11 and 4.12 reveal that the policy domain of natural disaster
in both chambers reflects a competitive coalition scenario. Not a single committee is the
primary venue as the destination of legislation. Fifteen committees in the House and a
dozen in the Senate are regular players in the policy realm, with competition the norm
during any particular year.
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Figure 4.12: Senate Natural Disaster Bill Referral: Committee Competition
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To reinforce the argument that the policy domain experiences competition, Figure
4.13 and 4.14 present a Herfindahl index score of each chamber.
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Figure 4.13: House Herfindahl Index: Turf Monopoly
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As illustrated by figures 4.13 and 4.14, referral of natural disaster proposals
resides within the jurisdiction of various committees. For example, the Senate with a Herf
score below .3 is a reflection of intense competition.
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Figure 4:14: Senate Herfindahl Index: Turf Monopoly

So far, I have established that not a single committee maintains a policy
monopoly over the referral of introduction throughout most of the period of analysis.
Also, competition arises as disaster serves as shocks to the system. As such, to examine
how the frame of disaster relief policy shifts, the two dominant images are thus
compared.

Comparison of the two dominant images of disaster relief
After mapping the civil defense and natural disaster agendas, it is clear that the
image of disaster relief has shifted in the U.S. between 1946 and 2005. When comparing
the number of bills introduced on both topics (figure 4.15), the House focuses primarily
on natural disaster issues, while civil defense issues are barely noticeable. This attention
to natural disaster corresponds with punctuating events such as Hurricane Camille (1969),
Hurricane Agnes (1972), the Great Midwest Flood (1993) and the Northridge Earthquake
(1994).
Figure 4.15: House Bills Introductions of Natural Disaster and Civil Defense
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On the other hand, the Senate (figure 4.16), focuses primarily on civil defense issues
while natural disaster issues are virtually absent. The Senate attention to civil defense
does not necessarily correlate with punctuating events, except in the case of the 9/11
attacks. For example, the peak in 1974 is associated with the debate regarding an allhazards approach to emergency management.
Figure 4.16: Senate Bills Introductions of Natural Disaster and Civil Defense
Senate Bill Introductions for Natural Disaster and Civil Defense, 1947-2005
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Three explanations may account for the above observations. First, given that state
and local governments are first responders to disasters, governors, congressional
representatives, and policymakers, have to ensure that sizeable federal resources are
allocated to their state for post-disaster redevelopment (Sylves, 2008). Second, when it
comes to wartime threats to national security, Larson et al. (2001) argue that the Senate
has always taken the lead in the matter because it has to address its budgetary aggregate.
Third, media attention, budget data and presidential attention could possibly explain the
shift in attention and salience in each policy domain. To further explore these
observations, I conducted a comparison between the series and ran a correlation by
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tracking bill introductions and presidential attention. Presidential attention is measured by
counting the number of times Presidents mention “civil defense” and “natural disaster’ in
their State of the Union Address.

Figure 4.17: Bill Introductions and Presidential State of the Union: Natural Disaster
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Figure 4.18: Bill Introductions and Presidential State of the Union: Civil Defense
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Figures 4.17 and 4.18 compare bill introductions and Presidential State of the
Union Addresses between the time series. The Pearson correlation for each time series.09
in the case of natural disasters and .1 for civil defense, suggest no relationship between
bill introductions and presidential attention in either domain.
Overall, based on the above congressional activities, when it comes to disaster
relief, it is understandable why FEMA, an agency created to handle natural disaster, and
transferred in 2003 to the Department of Homeland Security (with an emphasis on
counterterrorism), performed poorly in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. As the review
of figures above illustrates, Congress seems to shift the image of disaster relief as it
encounters them.
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Conclusion
This chapter documented the issues on the civil defense and natural disaster
agendas that receive attention, and where jurisdictional control and committee
competition reside. Throughout the analysis defense was the main issue on the civil
defense agenda. In the later-1950s throughout the early 1960s, attention to civil defense
peaked, and slightly decreased in the next twenty-three years. However, after the attacks
of September 11, 2001, the level of attention increased to some extent. The resulting
diversity of issues on the agenda---defense, shelter, insurance, nuclear, air patrol and
radiological---provided the Armed Services Committee the opportunity to guide the civil
defense. Unlike civil defense, natural disaster illustrated an overall increase in activity.
Once disaster emerged, a mix of issues comprised the agenda, not to mention the
presence of committee competition. In Congress, natural disaster bill referrals usually
involved competition, while the civil defense realm displayed more of the features of a
policy monopoly.
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Chapter Five
Dissecting Disaster Relief Agenda Setting and Efforts of Issue Redefinition

The previous chapter suggests that noticeable changes in the disaster relief agenda
as measured by bill introductions occur as a result of punctuating events. This chapter is
the second step in exploring and assessing the agenda of disaster relief policy through the
examination of legislative hearings. This analysis includes both legislative and nonlegislative hearings. Even though legislative hearings are important to agenda setting,
non-legislative hearings are also significant to the process because they enable
committees to frame or alter the definition of policy issues outside of their jurisdiction
(Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner, 1995, 384). There are three particular elements I will
explore in this chapter concerning the disaster relief agenda.
First, I want to assess the overall level of hearing activity in both the House and
the Senate. Similar to bill introductions, this chapter provides a general understanding of
the level of attention Congress gives to disaster relief policy. This longitudinal approach
is beneficial because it highlights whether a change in activity corresponds to a particular
“punctuating event.” Kingdon (1984) asserts that such focusing events are important
because they have the potential to influence the overall institutional agenda.
Second, I will explore the dynamics of policy jurisdiction and policy monopoly.
Identifying the committees that hold hearings tells something about the nature of disaster
policy turf, allowing me to highlight periods of competition and monopoly in both policy
streams in each chamber.
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Third, picking up on an observation by Birkland (1998), who discussed how
focusing events affect and shape policy communities, I will develop a coding instrument
with the intent to approximate the multiple dimensions of disaster relief policy.
Data Collection
Like other studies that track agenda entrance by focusing on congressional
activity, I focus on congressional hearings in this chapter. Hearings can include efforts of
issue redefinition as well as attempts to maintain the status quo (Hunt, 2002; Tzoumia,
2001; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Prior research suggests that hearings are a key
method by which Congress gathers policy information. By examining hearings in an
aggregate form over time, one is able to identify pertinent differences in the set of
interests active on a particular issue (Hardin, 2002; Sabatier and Jenkins Smith, 1993).
Utilizing the Congressional Information Service Index to Committee Hearings and
Abstracts on Committee Hearings, I was able to identify hearings dealing with disaster
relief policy between 1954 and 2007. In order to capture the swing between natural
disaster and civil defense, I conducted two searches. After consulting the “index terms”
function of the Congressional Index Service, the search terms “disasters,” “drought,”
“earthquake,” “fires and fire prevention,” “floods,” “storms,” and “tornadoes” were used
to identify hearings (and committees) that deal with natural disasters. In order to locate
hearings dealing with civil defense policy, I used terms such as “civil defense,” “Civil
Defense Advisory Council,” “Federal Civil Defense Administration,” “Office of Civil
Defense,” and “homeland security. ”
The initial search produced close to 4000 hearings. After eliminating
appropriations hearings and other hearings which did not actually deal with natural
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disasters or civil defense, I was left with a total of 3571 hearings—2109 in the House and
1462 in the Senate. The case of the House involved 1506 focused on natural disasters and
604 dealing with civil defense. The search of Senate produced 1005 focused on natural
disasters and 457 dealing with civil defense.
5.1. Mapping Hearing Activity
A review of figures 5.1 through 5.4 reveal several features of disaster relief
policy. Not surprisingly, until the events of September 2001, natural disasters occupied
more congressional space than does the discussion of civil defense (figures 5.1 and 5.2).
The obvious aside, the attention to civil defense in the House and Senate are strongly
correlated. Attention peaks in both chambers in 1950 and is focused on atomic energy,
and the attendant fallout dealing with bomb shelters makes civil defense somewhat
topical throughout the 1960. Interesting is the lack of focus on the events surrounding the
Cuban Missile Crisis in the House, despite the spike of attention in the Senate. Following
that spike in attention, hearing activity drops off to a mere trickle through most of 2001.
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Figure 5.1: House, Disaster Relief Policy 1945-2005
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Figure 5.2: Senate, Disaster Relief Policy 1954-2005
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Comparing each chamber’s treatment of natural disasters reveals periods of
incongruence not evident in the civil defense policy arena (figure 5.4). On the one hand,
the House and Senate series mirror one another for the period 1945 through 1977 with a
steady increase in attention over time. While the steady increase continues in the House
up through 1990, it drops off precipitously in the Senate and is marked by a steady
decline in attention until the events of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. In the 1990s, the House
also assumes this steady decline in attention to natural disasters until the events of
Hurricane Katrina.
Figure 5.3: Civil Defense Hearings, 1945-2005
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Figure 5.4: Natural Disaster Hearings, 1945-2005
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5.2. Policy Jurisdiction and Committee Competition
To explore the institutional agenda further, figures 5.5-5.8 identify the committees
that hold hearings in natural disaster and civil defense policy in the House and the Senate.
As Birkland (1998), among others has noted with regard to effort to formulate policy to
deal with hurricanes, disaster relief policy in both chambers appears nearly anarchic
(figures 5.5 and 5.6). Rather than asking who controls disaster relief policy, one might
instead be inclined to ask who does not control disaster relief policy. In all, thirteen
committees in the House and a dozen in the Senate are regular players in the policy
realm, with competition the norm during any particular year, as well as the dominant
motif over time. Quite simply, no one appears in charge.
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Compare this to the situation in the realm of civil defense (figures 5.7 and 5.8).
While it might be hard to image more committee involvement in a realm than that found
in the natural disasters, I identified fourteen committees in the House and sixteen in the
Senate who made a regular appearance in the civil defense realm over the course of the
study. This policy realm displays more of the features of a policy monopoly or subsystem
than is the case in natural disaster policy. While there are a wide variety of committees
that show up in six or more years between 1945 and 2006, there are much fewer regular
players. The Armed Service Committee is the dominant player in both chambers,
followed by Government Operations/Government Affairs Committee. It is not until 2002
that civil defense becomes subject to the intense competition and conflict that
characterizes disaster relief policy. Even then, Armed Services Committee maintains its
presence in the policy realm, although the renamed Senate Homeland Security and
Government Affairs Committee grab the largest portion of turf, followed closely by the
Judiciary Committee (at least initially). Similarly, the Homeland Security Committee is
a major new player in the House, although it appears to be involved in a realm
characterized by oligopoly, sharing near equal space with Judiciary and Government
Operations Committee.
This increased attention and the number of committees involved in the civil
defense realm supports the argument by Cobb and Elder (1972, 35) that agenda setting,
particularly the institutional agenda setting, is routinely characterized by the degree of
competition between sides. Additionally, attempts by various committees to determine
the civil defense agenda in 2002, confirms the work of Baumgartner of Jones (1993), who
indicate that most punctuating events lead to an increase in committee competition.
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Notably, the rise in competition during this crisis period (i.e. the attacks of September 11,
2001) coincides with the committee competition present during the referral of bill
introductions that was discusses in the previous chapter.
Overall, the initial foray into mapping attention and turf control suggests that civil
defense operates much like the classic policy monopoly, anchored by the Armed Service
committees which enjoy near monopoly control, interspaced with brief periods of
competition, and relatively low salience. The events of September 2001 served as a storm
in this relative calm, producing a new subsystem anchor in the Senate and
institutionalizing competition in the House. Given this analysis, I am puzzled by the
seemingly institutionalized anarchy found in the natural disaster policy realm, a subject to
which I now turn.

Figure 5.5: House, Natural Disaster Hearings: Committee Competition
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Figure 5.6: Senate, Natural Disaster Hearings: Committee Competition
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Figure 5.7: House, Civil Defense Hearings 1945-2005
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Figure 5.8: Senate, Civil Defense Hearings 1945-2005
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5.3. The Topic of Discussion
Picking up on an observation of Birkland (1998), who noted how focusing events
affect the shape of policy communities, I developed a coding instrument intended to
pinpoint the multiple dimensions of disaster relief policy. Birkland (1998, 62) found the
earthquake community was more “coherent, organized and ongoing” than was the case
with the policy community dealing with hurricanes. In view of this argument, one might
expect the identity and variety of committees involved in the discussion of earthquakes to
be markedly different than that focused on hurricanes (controlling for the free-for-all
associated with a punctuating event). By tracking the committees involved in various
aspects of disaster relief, I will be able to determine whether what looks like system level
chaos actually masks a more orderly process. Utilizing the advanced search function of
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the CIS, I broke disasters down by types, conducting separate searches for floods, storms,
tornadoes, fires, hurricanes, and earthquakes—six of the eight search terms produces
under “natural disaster’ heading. By doing so, I am looking for evidence that the various
sub-fields of disaster policy operate along lines associated with policy communities or
subsystems; that is, there is some coherence as to how Congress processes the various
issues.
Figures 5.9 and 5.10 track the committees involved in each policy realm for the
House and Senate respectively.

Figure 5.9: House, Natural Disaster Relief Policy by Topic
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Figure 5.10: Senate, Natural Disaster Relief Policy by Topic
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Based on the figures, only tornadoes in the House fit the criteria for a classic
policy monopoly, although many of policy realms find the bulk of hearings held by two
or three committees, suggesting a division of turf, very typical of a competitive
subsystem. Still, hearings dealing with storms in both chambers and hurricanes hearings
in the House appear to be a free for all, and fire hearings in the House are close to
becoming one.
Conclusion
This chapter presents the level of congressional attention and debate given to disaster
relief policy. In Chapter Two, I noted the Baumgartner and Jones (1993) theory, which
suggested policy equilibrium are a product of institutional arrangements and issue
framing. While the general consensus is that policy equilibrium is not static, the existence
of subsystems have functioned as wavering equilibrium against accepting a chaos theory
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of public policy. Quite simply, subsystem arrangements are dynamic, with change a
product of some combination of macro-level events and internal (coalition-based)
dynamics. Although it may not be anarchy incarnate, the natural disaster policy realm is
unusually chaotic. I believe that the chaos exhibited may have something with the nature
of such events. They are unexpected, even when, like hurricanes, they occur with a
certain amount of regularity. As such, their consequences are difficult to predict and
control. To some extent, they affect large areas of the population, so they invite
widespread participation. By contrast, so much civil defense involves preparation for an
event that may or may not occur, at least until September 11, 2001. This allowed a civil
defense policy system to develop that looked more like the standard institution-based
system for much of the 20th century. Overall, it seems that the near chaos found in
natural disaster hearings mirror the introduction and legislative referrals observed in the
previous chapter.

85

Chapter Six
Concluding Comments

I began this study with two objectives. The first was to examine the origins and
evolution of disaster relief policy in order to understand its shifting image. The second
was to understand how Congress governs the agenda of disaster relief policy in the postwar period.
So what does the research say about agenda setting and disaster relief policy?
First, the research confirms the observations of most scholars who assert that agenda
setting is a dynamic and inherently complex political process. In the case of my research,
three observations stand out: (1) Focusing events impact issue salience, (2) the
multidimensional nature of disaster relief policy allows various dimension of the issue to
gain agenda access and (3) the disaster relief policy subsystem has been formed through
incremental historical processes.
Disaster relief policy exhibited two distinct traits. First, the civil defense
subsystem functions primarily as a “dominant coalition.” Worsham suggests that in a
dominant coalition scenario “ a committee or subcommittee is able to establish
unquestioned jurisdiction in a particular policy area”(1997, 3). However, in the case of a
punctuating event, the policy equilibrium maintained by the dominant coalition tends to
be disrupted, leading to the emergence of previously excluded interests into the
subsystem. The study reveals a change in policy outcome as a result of the events of
September 11, 2001. Still, findings indicate that the Armed Services Committee in both
chambers is the dominant venue in civil defense policy, even when attention to the issue
is elevated.
86

Second, the natural disaster subsystem functions primarily as a “competitive
coalition.” As other scholars argue, in a competitive coalition scenario, competition may
be the result of challenges by members of other committees (and subsystems), who in
response to perceived threats to their autonomy, engage in turf wars (Worsham, 1997;
Ripley and Franklin, 1986; and King, 1997). In this study, these turf wars are elevated
when punctuating events occur, and as a result, the natural disaster policy realm is
unusually chaotic. That said, even during “normal times” the policy realm is one that
borders on near anarchy, with a wide variety of committees claiming a piece of the policy
domain. In regard to setting the disaster relief policy agenda in Congress, changes that
occur happen in both an incremental and radical fashion. When radical change occurs, the
old ways of doing things are replaced by new organizational forms (Baumgartner and
Jones, 1993, 235). For example, prior to 1950, disasters were viewed as “Acts of God.”
The accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant then necessitated the creation
of FEMA. FEMA was later restructured, reorganized and eventually moved to DHS
following the attacks of September 11, 2001. The Congressional agenda of disaster relief
policy is thus reactive in nature and characterized by the occurrence of organizational
change associated with punctuating events.

Aside from the approach taken in this study, there are certainly other venues and
perspectives to explore which would be useful for future research. For example, future
research could focus on the role of subcommittees in agenda setting, as well as highlight
the likely influence they may have in policy changes (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993,
202). At the macro-level, future research focusing on the Red Cross would enrich the
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literature on subsystem and policymaking. In addition, taking a closer look at the
presidency and the courts are another equally beneficial aspects to explore. While the
analysis would explore whether the actions of the president are linked to congressional
activities and efforts of issue redefinition, it would also explicitly assess whether
decisions rendered by the court disrupt the turf monopoly.
On the micro-level, focusing exclusively on how states and local governments
comply or fail to comply with federal guidelines can be of further research and
usefulness. For example, examining the response of the Governor of Louisiana and the
Mayor of New Orleans during and in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina would further
illustrate how communication and coordination can influence program delivery (Cropf,
2008). Furthermore, such an examination would also highlight the complexities of a
principal-agent relationship that have been noted by various scholars (Golden, 2000;
Brehm and Gates, 1999; Mitnick, 1984). In conclusion, the congressional approach
utilized for this research is only a beginning step in exploring the dynamic evolution of
disaster relief policy.
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Appendix
Table 4.1: Civil Defense Bill Introductions by Session
Year

Session

House

Senate

1947

80

3

4

1949

81

3

20

1951

82

3

26

1953

83

2

18

1955

84

17

10

1957

85

24

6

1959

86

2

6

1961

87

25

8

1963

88

11

2

1965

89

1

2

1967

90

1

0

1969

91

3

0

1971

92

4

0

1973

93

4

0

1975

94

12

2

1977

95

12

1

1979

96

9

2

1981

97

3

1

1983

98

2

1

1985

99

2

0

1987

100

2

2

1989

101

3

3

1991

102

2

1

1993

103

0

0

1995

104

0

0

1997

105

0

0

1999

106

1

0

2001

107

2

1

2003

108

12

7

2005

109

6

4

171

127

Total

94

Table 4.2: Disaster Relief Bill Introductions by Session
Year

Session

House

Senate

1947

80

29

14

1949

81

18

10

1951

82

17

10

1953

83

13

18

1955

84

83

20

1957

85

28

8

1959

86

21

0

1961

87

23

2

1963

88

26

14

1965

89

100

28

1967

90

113

6

1969

91

45

18

1971

92

88

70

1973

93

96

24

1975

94

70

10

1977

95

71

14

1979

96

44

11

1981

97

25

11

1983

98

23

11

1985

99

14

15

1987

100

13

9

1989

101

45

11

1991

102

27

13

1993

103

49

18

1995

104

19

6

1997

105

23

16

1999

106

21

19

2001

107

55

32

2003

108

16

7

2005

109

37

4

1.252

449

Total
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